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In criminal prosecutions, both state and federal, closely negotiated
agreements for immunity and lenient plea bargaining in return for co-
operation have acquired considerable importance. These agreements are
an ancient practice now wearing sophisticated modern dress. They may
arise in complex white-collar crime cases, organized crime cases, narcot-
ics prosecutions, and, from time to time, in other prominent major fel-
ony cases. They constitute a phenomenon that differs in important
ways from the run-of-the-mill guilty pleas that characterize our metro-
politan courts and recently have preoccupied students of the criminal
system. Unlike the ordinary guilty plea, the suspect or defendant in co-
operation agreements offers more than just a quick result that saves
public resources; in this kind of case that limited consideration often
would not be attractive enough to induce leniency since the government
may be quite willing to spend time and money in prosecuting. In coop-
eration agreements the defendant trades information1 and testimony,
with the promise of enabling the State' to make a case against other
defendants who, for one reason or another, are regarded as most deserv-
ing of the severest form of prosecution.'
Again, unlike the great run of guilty pleas, the deal made in more
complex criminal cases cannot be sealed with a chat in the hall just
before entering the courtroom. Compacts for cooperation may involve
contested issues that must be negotiated, sometimes for months, and
that eventually are embodied in letter agreements that range from the
fairly straightforward to the extremely complicated.4 Most important,
in these cases the State cannot speedily conclude the deal with a plea
1. See the discussion in KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 14-18 (1985), in
which the author represents the struggle to obtain and control information as the principal issue in
defense trial preparation or plea negotiation in complex white-collar crime cases.
2. The terms "state" and "government" in this Article refer to the prosecution in a general
sense and are not meant to imply a distinction between state and federal prosecutions.
8. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested, "Promises of immunity are impor-
tant weapons in the fight against large-scale criminal enterprises; the government often snares big
fish with information gained from little fish. In return, the little fish are granted immunity from
prosecution based upon the information they provide to the government." United States v.
Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245, 246 (7th Cir. 1990). Sometimes the fish are all one size and the one who
receives immunity may be simply the one who first shows a convincing readiness to cooperate. A
defendant who elects to go to trial may be found especially deserving of rigorous prosecution as
compared with one who early shows a desire to plead and cooperate.
4. The complexity may arise from the need to define in detail and with precision: (1) the
nature of the cooperation promised by the cooperator, and (2) the scope of the immunity or nature
of the plea bargain that is extended. In Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987), discussed infra
notes 29-45 and accompanying text, the plea agreement comprised 17 paragraphs. The full text of
the agreement, taking up two pages of the Law Reports, is contained in Appendix A to the en bane




and a sentence and still protect its interests. The cooperator makes a
set of promises and assumes potentially onerous and protracted obliga-
tions. These will at least include interviews and debriefings and may
involve undercover action or observation and reporting back. The coop-
erator's obligations will probably continue into more formal stages with
grand jury and trial testimony and, perhaps, testimony at retrials years
later. The State must find a way, therefore, to keep the immunity grant
or plea bargain contingent on the cooperator's substantial performance
of the promised obligations. The usual sequence of plea and sentencing,
with the consequent engagement of the double jeopardy clause, would
render these long-term cooperation agreements worthless unless the
State carefully drafts the agreements to avoid this hazard.
For these reasons, deals involving promises to cooperate are
sharply different from the general phenomenon of plea bargaining.
They are exotic plants that can survive only in an environment from
which some of the familiar features of the criminal procedure landscape
have been expunged. A way must be found to prop open the double
jeopardy lid; sentencing (if it is a plea agreement rather than an immu-
nity grant) must be postponed, perhaps for years; immunity (if it is an
immunity deal) must be contingent and not irrevocable. The prosecutor
must retain the power to enforce the cooperation agreement for as long
as necessary. In the end the disposition will be dictated by the terms
that were negotiated and by the prosecutor's ability to hold the defend-
ant to those terms.
Many years ago Sir Henry Maine, in the context of the civil law,
made the famous observation that a conspicuous feature of modern so-
ciety and modern law was a "movement from Status to Contract." 5
That movement has now reached the criminal justice system both with
mass plea bargaining and with cooperation agreements. If a regular
practice of sentence discounts for guilty pleas represents the bureaucra-
tization of criminal justice, then the cooperation agreement marks its
privatization.' In cooperation agreements the prosecutor and defendant
resolve suspicion or charges by contract. Any subsequent litigation be-
tween the defendant and the prosecutor thus turns largely to concepts
5. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (1st Am. ed. 1864) (emphasis omitted).
6. As one scholar has noted, "Plea bargaining undercuts [the] distinctive moral aspects of the
criminal law. First, negotiated dispute resolution 'privatizes' the dispute by empowering the par-
ties themselves to resolve it without any significant involvement by either the public or the
courts." Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Bur-
ger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L. J. 185, 219 (1983) (footnote omitted). It may seem
odd to refer to "privatization" when the state remains a party, but the characterization is apt in
the sense that public standards of guilt and procedures for fact-finding yield to negotiated disposi-




taken from contract law. In mass plea bargaining the defendant sub-
scribes to a contract of adhesion.7 With cooperation agreements, by
contrast, the terms are fashioned individually and the contract is execu-
tory on both sides.
These developments invite attention for several reasons. First, they
redirect us to perennial questions about the free-ranging discretion of
the American prosecutor. Second, they raise again the old question of
whether it is fair to convict defendants on purchased testimony. Third,
they invite reflection on the fairness of both the process and the result
of the bargaining for immunity or for a plea for concessions. Fourth,
they invite some appraisal of the changing face of the criminal process.
This Article examines these questions in the context of an overall
survey of cooperation agreements. It identifies cooperation agreements
as a subject worthy of detailed scrutiny in the future.
Part II traces the history of informal immunity grants and dis-
cusses their nature. Part III examines the prosecutor's discretion in
choosing whom to immunize or treat leniently in return for cooperation,
and discusses ways of monitoring the exercise of that discretion. Part
IV raises the question of whether testimony admitted under coopera-
tion agreements sometimes infringes on a defendant's right to a fair
trial while Part V discusses whether the enforcement of these agree-
ments by the government sometimes imposes an unfair burden on the
cooperating witness. Part VI comments on how the existence of a coop-
eration agreement produces changes in the conventional forms and
practices of the criminal process.
II. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF INFORMAL IMMUNITY GRANTS
Cooperation agreements may take the form of plea bargains or of
informal immunity agreements. The general contours of the plea bar-
gain are familiar enough, but at the outset we need to say something
about the special features of informal grants of immunity. Nearly all
jurisdictions have formal statutory provisions under which a court,
upon application of a prosecutor, may grant immunity. The federal
statutes requires that a senior Justice Department officer 9 approve a
7. The term "contract of adhesion" refers to a standardized form of offer about which one
party, usually a consumer, has no liberty to negotiate and simply must take or leave the offered
terms. See Freidrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1943).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1988).
9. The request must be approved by "the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General,
Associate Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General or Deputy Assistant
Attorney General." Id. § 6003(b). In practice the request almost invariably is referred to the Assis-
tant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.
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federal prosecutor's application. It further states that the United States
Attorney who makes the application must declare that the witness's
testimony "may be necessary to the public interest" and that the wit-
ness "has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other infor-
mation on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.' ' 10
Formal applications for immunity give the prosecutor certain ad-
vantages. A court has little or no discretion to refuse a formal applica-
tion.1" Also, after the court grants immunity, it may sanction the
witness for contempt if he refuses to testify. The formal grant is thus
well suited to compelling the recalcitrant witness. There are, however,
features that make formal immunity grants less suitable for cooperation
agreements.
First, if the formal grant is made in a public proceeding, the poten-
tially important element of secrecy will be shattered. For example, once
a court grants a subject formal immunity in a public proceeding, it be-
comes difficult to use her in an undercover capacity to report on activi-
ties of her associates. In some jurisdictions, including the federal, courts
may seal the immunity grant to avoid this problem.' 2
Second, the grant's only direct impact is to immunize as to the use
of testimony and its fruits, thereby compelling the subject to testify.
The grant cannot, for example, expressly compel the subject to submit
to debriefing and interviewing by agents of the prosecution or to work
in an undercover capacity, though the prosecutor might apply for the
grant on the basis of the cooperator's agreement to perform these
tasks.13 Even the testimony is not guaranteed since the subject may be
10. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b).
11. The federal statute affords no discretion, providing that the United States district court
"shall issue" an order directing the witness to testify upon request by the government attorney. 18
U.S.C. § 6003(a) (emphasis added). In Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 541 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978), the Seventh Circuit noted that a court has no power to review a
United States Attorney's conclusion that conferring immunity is in the public interest. According
to the court, because "that judgment is entirely a matter for the executive branch, unreviewable by
a court, there is no need for the record to contain any facts supporting the decision of the United
States Attorney." Id.
12. Federal formal immunity usually is granted in the context of grand jury proceedings. The
immunity grant thus typically is covered by the secrecy provisions that apply to the grand jury.
See FED. R CRI. P. 6(e)(2) and (3) (imposing a general rule of secrecy on "matters occurring
before the grand jury"). Formal immunity occasionally is granted in open court to a witness about
to testify at a trial.
13. See Marc L. Sherman, Informal Immunity: Don't You Let That Deal Go Down, 21 Loy.
LA. L. REv. 1, 48-49 (1987). This point is somewhat academic since, while the courts in the setting
of formal immunity cannot apply sanctions for failing to undergo interviews or work undercover,
the prosecutor actually loses nothing, because the formal immunity, while irrevocable, has no im-
pact except to prohibit the use of any testimony the cooperator provides as a witness. The cooper-
ator can be prosecuted if he does not testify or even if he testifies, provided no direct or derivative
use is made of his testimony. See note 14 infra.
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willing to undergo the sanction of punishment for contempt rather than
testify. In that case the prosecution can do nothing more to procure the
testimony though it may be able to prosecute the subject without the
testimony.
Third, because the formal grant of immunity is restricted to "use
and fruits immunity,"' 4 the subject remains vulnerable to the possibil-
ity of a prosecution based on evidence not derived from the testimony
compelled by the grant.'5 So narrow a protection may be an insufficient
inducement to secure full cooperation. The greater security of transac-
tional immunity may be necessary to convince the subject to cooper-
ate.'" Conversely, in some cases transactional immunity has the added
attraction for prosecutors of allowing them to define precisely the area
of immunization by the terms of the agreement. The prosecutor thus
may exclude certain crimes from the reach of the bargain if she does
not wish to release the subject completely from liability. In this way
transactional immunity may be narrower than use and fruits immunity
since both crimes related to the testimony and other crimes may be
excluded from the scope of immunity.17
14. Section 6002 provides that when an immunity order is issued "no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." 18
U.S.C. § 6002 (1988). Known as use and derivative use immunity (informally "use and fruits"), this
is the degree of immunity required by the United States Constitution to erase the privilege against
self-incrimination. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). This was the type of immu-
nity conferred on Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North when he testified before the congressional com-
mittees investigating the Iran-contra matter in the summer of 1987. United States v. North, 910
F.2d 843, 851, later proceeding 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 16490 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
15. The government, however, carries the heavy burden in such a case of proving "that the
evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the com-
pelled testimony." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. This Kastigar requirement has been enforced with a
degree of rigor. See North, 910 F.2d at 861 (holding that testimony was tainted when witnesses
may have refreshed their memory or focused their thoughts by adverting to the earlier, immunized
testimony of the defendant). If informal immunity is stipulated to be of the use and derivative use
kind, or if the agreement is silent as to its exact scope, then the Kastigar standards are applicable.
See United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the Kastigar tests to
statements made by a defendant while negotiating for an immunity deal that was never finalized).
16. Transactional immunity means that the government cannot charge the witness with any
offense about which he provided evidence. He may, however, be charged with perjury or contempt.
Some jurisdictions, including New York, require transactional immunity to be conferred to meet
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed, New York confers automatic trans-
actional immunity on every witness who is summoned to testify before the grand jury. N.Y. CRIM.
PROc. LAW §§ 50.10, 190.40(2) (McKinney 1981-82). In order to avoid the sweep of transactional
immunity, New York prosecutors sometimes will bargain with a grand jury witness to waive his
statutory immunity and accept instead an informal immunity agreement limited to use and deriva-
tive use immunity.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954
(1980), discussed infra in notes 163-72 and accompanying text. Conversely, transactional immunity
can reach crimes that will not form the subject of any part of the witness's testimony and as to
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Sometimes, to offer the amplest measure of protection, the cooper-
ator may seek and the government may wish to extend a combination of
transactional and use and fruits immunity. The witness thus may gain
immunity from use or derivative use of any testimony he gives and si-
multaneously obtain total immunity from prosecution for categories of
offenses denominated in the agreement, whether or not the testimony
given relates to them. In most jurisdictions the simple use and fruits
immunity is all that flows from a formal grant. Prosecutors and sub-
jects, therefore, often cannot achieve these desirable combinations and
permutations through a formal grant. To escape these confinements,
prosecutors have long been in the habit of offering to potential coopera-
tors informal grants of immunity, sometimes called "letter immunity"
or "pocket (or hip-pocket) immunity." These informal grants can be
flexibly shaped to fit the contours of the deal that is negotiated.
A. History of the Practice
The old common law recognized a practice of "approvement" under
which a person arraigned for a felony might accuse another as his ac-
complice and become entitled to a pardon if the accused accomplice
were convicted.' Apart from approvement, which fell into disuse by the
eighteenth century,19 there also existed an informal practice by which
an accused, though not legally entitled to a pardon, could obtain one by
confessing to the crime and revealing his accomplices."0 This practice
was rife in the nineteenth century when the lack of an organized police
force often made it essential to procure accomplice testimony in order
to track down or build a case against a major criminal. It was customary
to advertise prominently the offer of pardons to accomplices who would
come forward and testify leading to a conviction of the principal and to
which use and fruits immunity thus would offer no protection.
18. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *330, cited in The Whiskey Cases (United States
v. Ford), 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878).
19. The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 599 (describing approvement as an "obsolete practice").
Approvement had earlier come under severe criticism. Chief Justice Hale wrote, "The truth is that
more mischief hath come to good men, by these kinds of approvements by false accusations of
desperate villains, than benefit to the public by the discovery and convicting of real offenders."
MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 226 (1678).
20. Lord Mansfield described this informal practice as follows:
Where the accomplice has made a full and fair confession of the whole truth and is admitted
as a witness for the crown, the practice is, if he act fairly and openly and discover the whole
truth, though he is not entitled of right to a pardon, yet the usage, the lenity and the practice
of the court is to stop the prosecution against the accomplice, the understanding being that
he has an equitable title to a recommendation for the king's mercy.




offer cash payments to witnesses who might come forward.21
In The Whiskey Cases22 the Supreme Court discussed the practice
in surprisingly modern terms. After recognizing the importance of
prosecutorial discretion in deciding when immunization is necessary to
apprehend other criminals, the Court described what evidently was re-
garded as a familiar procedure under which the prosecutor would inter-
view the accomplice in an attempt to estimate the need for his
testimony. In such a setting, the Court recommended:
Prosecutors ... should explain to the accomplice that he is not obliged to crimi-
nate himself, and inform him just what he may reasonably expect in case he acts in
good faith, and testifies fully and fairly as to his own acts in the case, and those of
his associates. When he fulfils those conditions he is equitably entitled to a pardon,
and the prosecutor, and the court if need be, when fully informed of the facts, will
join in such a recommendation."
The Court was careful to explain that the existence of such an
agreement and the defendant's full performance under it could not op-
erate as a plea in bar to quash an indictment.24 The practical conse-
quences, however, appeared little different from a successful motion to
dismiss, since the Court recognized that the defendant had an equitable
right to a pardon and to a delay in the trial pending application for
one. 25 The Court also recognized the essentially contingent features of
the practice, commenting that if the defendant later refused to comply
with the conditions of the agreement, he might be tried and convicted
since his bad faith would forfeit his "equitable title to protection. ' 26
B. The Modern Practice
Modern practice thus has ancient roots. Significantly, the Court's
discussion, in 1878 involved no requirement of judicial approval for the
immunity offer but acknowledged the prosecutor's unrestricted discre-
tion to purchase testimony through immunity agreements. There al-
21. The tremendous inducement sometimes offered under this practice is described in the
Welsh-language account of a murder in rural Wales in 1840 in G. PHMLs, LLOFRUDDIAITH SHA-
DnAcH Lawis [The Murder of Shadrach Lewis] (1986), where the reward notice read:
A reward of 200 pounds ... will be given to any person who will afford such information and
evidence as shall lead to the discovery and conviction of the murderers and Lord Normanby
[the Secretary of State] will advise the grant of Her Majesty's most precious pardon to any
accomplice, not being the actual murderer, who will give such evidence as shall lead to the
same result.
Id. at 40 (translated from the Welsh). The author noted the huge dimensions of the reward, stating
that "[t]o a farm laborer earning six shillings a week [15 pounds a year] 200 pounds was a for-
tune." Id. at 40-41.
22. 99 U.S. 594 (1878).
23. Id. at 604.
24. Id. at 601.
25. Id. at 606.
26. Id. at 605.
[Vol. 45:1
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ways has been, however, a tension arising out of the difficulty of
harmonizing informal prosecutorial practices with the formal statutory
procedures for granting immunity by way of judicial order.
Questions about the validity of the informal practice may arise in
two ways. First, a reluctant witness may claim that the prosecutor has
no power outside existing statutes to override his privilege against self-
incrimination and compel his testimony by offering an informal immu-
nity. Courts have upheld this contention, applying a jealous scrutiny to
the destruction of a constitutional privilege against the will of the party
involved. When a witness's constitutional rights are at stake, courts
properly hold that the prosecution must comply strictly with a legisla-
tive declaration of the formal procedure necessary to extinguish the
privilege. 8
Second, questions about the validity of the informal practice arise
when a defendant claims that he should not be prosecuted because he
was informally immunized under a cooperation agreement and has per-
formed his side of the bargain. The prosecutor may allege that the de-
fendant did not perfectly carry out the terms of the bargain, or a
subsequent prosecutor may not feel bound by the actions of a predeces-
sor,29 or there may be a dispute as to whether the prosecutor and de-
fendant ever arrived at an immunity for cooperation deal. When the
defendant negotiates for immunity in exchange for testimony, the con-
siderations are sharply different than when a reluctant witness chal-
lenges a prosecutor's power to offer informal immunity. For a court to
refuse to validate an agreement that a suspect bargained for would dis-
able that suspect from advantageously waiving the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. This judicial intransigence would be difficult
to reconcile with the affirmative attitude that courts now display to-
ward plea bargaining ° and would be a strong brake on prosecutorial
27. Commonwealth v. Brown, 619 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1981), overruled on other grounds by
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1983); Grand Jurors for Middlesex County v. Wal-
lace, 343 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. 1976); State v. Saliterman, 150 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1967); Campus v.
State, 580 P.2d 966 (N.M. 1978); Apodaca v. Viramontes, 212 P.2d 425 (N.M. 1949); Common-
wealth v. Carrera, 227 A.2d 627 (Pa. 1967); Commonwealth v. Brady, 323 A.2d 866 (Pa. Super.
1974). Contra In re Kelly, 350 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Ark. 1978); Surina v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d 969
(Alaska 1981). See generally Robert M. Schoenhaus, Annotation, Prosecutor's Power to Grant
Prosecution Witness Immunity from Prosecution, 4 A.L.R. 4TH 1221 (1981). In Higdon v. State,
367 So.2d 991 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), the court, without any discussion of fairness issues, reversed
a conviction on the ground, inter alia, that the testimony of a witness had been received over his
claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege solely because the trial court had relied on the prosecu-
tor's purporting to immunize the witness in court. Id. at 992, 993.
28. See cases cited supra note 27.
29. See infra note 152.
30. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court said that plea bargaining "is
an essential component of the administration of justice [and] ... is to be encouraged." Id. at 260.
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discretion. Furthermore, if a bargain was struck and the defendant per-
formed his part, it seems intolerably unfair to allow the prosecutor to
renege and subject the cooperator to the penalties that he paid to avoid.
While this context presents compelling considerations for honoring
informal bargains, dangers still are discernable in the immunity for co-
operation deal that are not present in the run-of-the-mill plea bargain
in which the prosecutor simply trades immunity for a quick disposition.
With the cooperation agreement, the prosecutor buys a witness's testi-
mony against another defendant. This raises sensitive questions about
the credibility of the testimony and the propriety of absolute
prosecutorial discretion over whom to pursue rigorously and whom to
allow to buy out of the criminal process. An immunity deal is also a
more absolute benefit than a plea bargain, for the subject is escaping
scot free by not submitting to any conviction or sanction. 1 Finally,
while a court must hold a plea hearing and approve a plea bargain, the
informal immunity deal is not subject to any judicial scrutiny.
Some courts, therefore, have displayed reluctance to concede unfet-
tered prosecutorial discretion to enter into informal immunity for coop-
eration agreements. 2 These courts may insist that only the court has
discretion to dismiss a prosecution and that even a faithfully performed
agreement to testify is no absolute bar to a future prosecution. s More
Plea bargaining, the Court observed, is "highly desirable" and "when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the induce-
ment or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 261, 262.
31. This is not always the case. Some immunity agreements may require the cooperator to
disgorge profits from illegal transactions.
32. This discussion is confined to agreements entered into between cooperators and prosecu-
tors. A separate topic not pursued in this Article is the validity of agreements entered into between
cooperators and investigative agents. Here some courts are more willing to ignore the agreement on
the ground that the agent was not authorized to make an agreement not to prosecute. In such a
case the position of the cooperator may be protected to an extent by suppressing any statements
he made or any evidence derived from them. This was the course taken by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Mich. 1988). For a discussion of this case, see
Recent Case, 102 HARv. L. REV. 539 (1988). Federal courts are more willing to enforce such agree-
ments with investigative agents. See generally United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir.
1983) (involving DEA agents); United States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058 (1st Cir. 1975) (involving
the SEC). This may be due to the close working relationship between federal agents and United
States Attorneys, both of whom operate under the ultimate control of the Department of Justice.
33. State v. Johnson, 594 P.2d 514 (Ariz. 1979); Commonwealth v. Brown, 619 S.W.2d 699
(Ky. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Commissioner, 652 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1983).
Compare the earlier decision, In re Parham, 431 P.2d 86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967), in which the court
distinguished between an agreement to testify, which it viewed as generally enforceable, citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 549, and an agreement to give information, which it declared
was enforceable only at the court's discretion. Id. at 88-89. The policy behind the distinction is
that when a defendant agrees only to provide information, he has not waived any constitutional
rights as he does when he agrees to give self-incriminating testimony. People v. Marquez, 644 P.2d
59 (Colo. App. 1981); see also State v. Borrego, 445 So.2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In Gipson
v. State, 375 So.2d 514 (Ala. 1979), the court held that the prosecutor could not confer informal
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frequently, courts deny that the prosecutor has the power to grant im-
munity, but simultaneously recognize good reasons for rejecting the
prosecution of a defendant who performed his side of the bargain in an
immunity-cooperation dealA4 Sometimes this takes the weak form, de-
rived from the ancient doctrine of approvement and The Whiskey
Cases,5 of acknowledging the defendant's equitable right to a pardon."
Most courts, however, now take a more expansive approach.
3 7
While usually refusing to accord the prosecutor a power to
immunize,38 they often are willing to devise an approach that
effectively bars the prosecution of a defendant who has kept his part
of the cooperation agreement. These courts have relied on notions
of the honor and dignity of the State,39 the fair administration of
justice,4 0  and contractual theories of consideration 41  or equitable
transactional immunity.
34. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
35. See supra part II.A.
36. In Bowie v. State, 287 A.2d 782 (Md. App. 1972), the court stated in dicta that while the
defendant after performance under a cooperation agreement had only an equitable right to clem-
ency, the court usually would grant a continuance so that the defendant could apply for clemency.
Id. at 788-89. By contrast, in King v. United States, 203 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1953), the court stated
that the right to clemency arising out of the ancient doctrine of approvement and set forth in The
Whiskey Cases was no longer a part of federal law. Id. at 526.
37. For a review of justifications in this area, see Note, Judicial Supervision of Non-Statu-
tory Immunity, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334 (1974). In United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d
245 (7th Cir. 1990), the court, referring to informal grants of use and derivative use immunity, said
that "[s]uch grants of immunity are fully enforceable." Id. at 248 (citing United States v. Williams,
809 F.2d 1072, 1081-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987)); United States v. Society of
Indep. Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461, 469-74 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981);
United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1976)).
38. This is no doubt because of fears of too loosely permitting prosecutors to compel reluc-
tant witnesses to testify.
39. United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742, 747 (D.D.C. 1969). In United States v. Carter,
454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974), the court observed: "There is more
at stake than just the liberty of this defendant. At stake is the honor of the government[,] public
confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice in a
federal scheme of government." Id. at 428.
40. See, e.g., State v. Hingle, 139 So.2d 205 (La. 1962); State v. Ashby, 195 A.2d 635 (N.J.
1963), rev'd, 204 A.2d 1 (1964). In Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979), a case
in which the prosecution promised to drop charges if the defendant passed a polygraph test, the
court, in finding the promise enforceable, said:
The standards of the market place do not and should not govern the relationship between the
government and a citizen .... If the government breaks its word, it breeds contempt for
integrity and good faith. It destroys the confidence of citizens in the operation of their gov-
ernment and invites them to disregard their obligations.
Id. at 207, quoted in 2 WAYNE R LAFAvE & JEROLD H. IsRAzL, CRMNAL PROCEDURE § 13.5, at 207
(1984).
41. People v. Brunner, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). In Brunner the prosecutor
was dissatisfied with the performance of the defendant as a cooperating witness and sought to
prosecute on the ground that his purported immunity grant was inoperative because it did not
conform with the statutory procedures. The court held that it would be inequitable to allow the
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estoppel.42 One can now find recognition of the enforceability of these
agreements not only in cases in which the defendant has performed an
agreement to testify4" but also in cases in which the defendant agreed
only to cooperate in bringing other offenders to justice without
testifying.
This willingness to recognize that informal agreements not to pros-
ecute are binding seems an inevitable outcome of deep tendencies in
the American criminal justice system. It emerges from the confluence of
two important phenomena-our hardly questioned tradition of wide
prosecutorial discretion and the benedictions bestowed by the Supreme
Court on plea bargaining." Because there is no effective doctrine under
which courts can compel a prosecutor to proceed against a suspect when
no charges have been filed, an agreement not to prosecute remains
largely inaccessible to judicial intervention.45 This is the source of the
power. For the prosecutor to treat one defendant leniently in order to
procure that individual's testimony against others has long been a fa-
miliar practice in plea bargaining. If a reduced sentence or charge is
appropriate for the cooperating defendant, why should it be wrong to
take one more step and immunize the cooperator altogether when, in
the prosecutor's judgment, that is the only way of proceeding success-
fully against more culpable or more dangerous offenders? This is the
justification for the exercise of the power. But neither the tradition of
prosecutorial discretion nor the utility of dealing for cooperation as a
way of building a case altogether dispels the concerns to which this Ar-
prosecution to go forward since the prosecutor had received substantially the performance for
which he had bargained. The consideration issue presents difficulties when the cooperator stands
ready to perform but performance becomes unnecessary. This situation may arise, for example,
when the defendant pleads guilty. See infra text accompanying notes 213-15.
42. Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982).
43. See United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1983).
44. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
45. The Supreme Court has stated that "the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case... ..." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 693 (1974). An application can be made by mandamus, or a local equivalent, to force a prose-
cutor to bring charges. A leading federal case in which such an attempt was made is Inmates of
Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973). The court dismissed the
application on the grounds that there is no duty to prosecute and that the principle of separation
of powers, the impracticality of judicial review, and the dangers of allowing private parties to open
up the prosecutor's files all contribute to the inappropriateness of acceding to mandamus. Id. For a
full discussion, see 2 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, at §§ 13.2, 13.3. Once charges have been
fied, a prosecutor's power to withdraw them (to nol pros) in most jurisdictions is subject to some
degree of judicial review. Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a
United States Attorney may file for dismissal "by leave of [the] court." The purpose of this provi-
sion is primarily to protect the defendant from harassment, see Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S.
22 (1977), but it also confers some power on the court to inquire whether the proposed dismissal is
"contrary to manifest public interest," United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975),




III. THE PERILS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHOOSING
COOPERATORS
Questions of ethics and policy arise when prosecutors confer immu-
nity or make lenient bargains for cooperation in cases where the witness
almost certainly could be convicted of a serious offense or would, absent
the bargain, be sentenced more severely on a straightforward guilty
plea." May lesser imps justifiably be liberated if this will snare the
grand Satan, or can no good come from bargains with the devil? One
possible view is that the prosecutor should never reduce a charge or
release an offender unless some aspect of the commission of the crime
substantially diminishes culpability. This would not cover later repen-
tance or rehabilitation even if evidenced by restitution or cooperation.
Such postcrime actions indeed may support a finding that the offender
is not as bad as the crime alone might indicate. One could argue, how-
ever, that in the division of responsibilities this is a matter for a sen-
tencing judge, and that prosecutors should confine themselves to
assessing the gravity of crimes already committed.
Indeed, even if the prosecutor acted properly in judging the moral
character of the defendant or suspect, most cooperation agreements
would be difficult to fit into any concept of repentance or rehabilita-
tion.4 7 These are agreements to sell a commodity-knowledge. The wit-
ness usually gains that knowledge through participation in criminal
conduct, and the offer of testimony is a calculated attempt to gain im-
munity or leniency. Freeing such a person can powerfully excite the
public's sense of injustice.
While this narrow view of the prosecutor's proper role sharply con-
tradicts our actual practice in many cases, it has an almost irresistible
appeal in cases involving the most serious crimes of personal violence,
such as rape and murder. In those cases a cooperation deal would leave
the crime inadequately punished. Suppose, for example, that murderer
X, against whom the prosecutor has a strong case with respect to the
averagely evil murder A, offers strong testimony against murderer Y,
46. This is not always so. The case against a cooperator may contain flaws which will
strengthen the prosecutorial disposition to confer immunity or a favorable bargain. There may,
indeed, be no real case against a cooperator, but he may seek immunity to guard against a chance
that what he relays by way of cooperation might incriminate him.
47. This might be disputed by prosecutors who likely would assert that the cooperator, by his
conduct, will strike a blow at crime and, in some cases, will effectively terminate the activities of a
criminal organization to which he once belonged. This potential is undeniable, and this form of
"restitution" may make the bargain a good one for society, but the cooperator's actions are not the
same as an unsolicited demonstration of a change of heart by a criminal.
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who is suspected of the peculiarly horrifying serial murders B, C, and D,
and, against whom the prosecutor has no case without X's testimony.
While the prosecutor might offer X some degree of leniency, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that she would immunize X as to murder A, even if
she believed that Y was conspicuously more evil and dangerous than X.
This is because immunity would leave the score quite unsettled as to
murder A with no retribution and no requital to the family of the vic-
tim. By contrast, prosecutors often are ready to make full immunity
deals with respect to serious "victimless" crimes, such as controlled
substance offenses, in which the public does not so clearly hear the
voices of an individual victim and his family crying for retribution.
Prosecutors sometimes enter into cooperation agreements with sus-
pects of even the most violent offenses when there are joint perpetra-
tors. In those cases, if prosecutors sometimes offer immunity or a
favorable plea to an accomplice even in a spectacularly horrible murder,
they do so with the aim that the worst offenders in that murder shall
not escape retribution. Immunization in such cases is a painful accom-
modation to produce the most retribution for the crime at the price of
permitting some participants to escape their deserts altogether. Al-
though the public's sense of injustice may be excited by such a bargain,
it might be equally aroused if the planner or ringleader of the crime
went untouched because no deal was cut.
The Principles of Federal Prosecution set out by the United States
Department of Justice recognize in very general terms the propriety of
permitting the prosecutor to make a utilitarian calculation. 8 Under
these principles a prosecutor has a duty to neutralize the largest num-
ber of units possible of culpability and dangerousness expressed in be-
havior that the criminal code prohibits. As to each potential defendant,
48. The Department of Justice's PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, Part F (1980), pro-
vides, in part:
1. Except as hereafter provided, the attorney for the government may, with supervisory ap-
proval, enter into a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for a person's cooperation when,
in his judgment, the person's timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public interest
and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be
effective.
2. In determining whether a person's cooperation may be necessary to the public interest, the
attorney for the government, and those whose approval is necessary, should weigh all relevant
considerations, including: (a) the importance of the investigation or prosecution to an effec-
tive program of law enforcement; (b) the value of the person's cooperation to the investigation
or prosecution; and (c) the person's relative culpability in connection with the offense or of-
fenses being investigated or prosecuted and his history with respect to criminal activity.
Also noteworthy are the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLM Or GUITY § 1.8(a)-(v) (Approved
Draft, 1968), which acknowledge as a justification for a plea bargain that "the defendant has given
or offered cooperation when such cooperation has resulted or may result in the successful prosecu-
tion of other offenders engaged in equally serious or more serious criminal conduct."
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the prosecutor must make a difficult calculation to measure the moral
weight of the culpability, including the harm done, and the future dan-
ger to the public. When she can gather no more evidence without in-
ducements, the prosecutor then decides whether to proceed and
prosecute those suspects against whom the already produced evidence
makes a case or whether to extend leniency or full immunity to some
suspects in order to procure testimony against other, more dangerous
suspects against whom existing evidence is flimsy or nonexistent.
This utilitarian approach is surely the correct one. A prosecutor
has multiple public interests to protect and her concept of justice
should be a synthetic one that blends considerations of public safety
with judgments of moral culpability.49 Fortunately, the two standards
will not clash often since the morally worst offender is often the most
dangerous. If the prosecutor makes the agreements properly, she
achieves the maximum possible degree of retribution for moral wrong-
doing and the maximum future protection of the public with respect to
that crime. Naturally, prosecutors always should perceive immunization
as a last resort. The thrifty prosecutor will buy cooperation at the low-
est price, s° and immunization should only rarely be necessary. In the
worst cases, however, or in cases in which the suspect's crime is not so
serious and his cooperation may be very fruitful, the skillfully repre-
sented suspect sometimes will be able to extract a high price.
A prosecutor's decisions in this area are painfully delicate. She is
often not in a position to explain or defend her decisions. At an early
stage in the case public statements may reveal too much to other de-
fendants. Courts, in any case, may prohibit comment by the prosecu-
tor;51 even if they do not, comment may appear unseemly.
While we may sympathize with the prosecutor's difficult position,
49. Judgments about public safety involve predictions of future dangerousness that are very
difficult to make with precision. See Graham Hughes, Legal Aspects of Predicting Dangerousness,
in 2 CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 57 (Richard Rosner ed., 1985); THE
PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE (Fernand N. Dutile & Cleon H. Foust eds., 1987); Franklin E.
Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, 85 MiCH. L. REv. 481 (1986).
50. The Principles of Federal Prosecution stipulate:
In entering into a non-prosecution agreement, the attorney for the government should, if
practicable, explicitly limit the scope of the government's commitment to: (a) non-prosecution
based directly or indirectly on the testimony or other information provided; or (b) non-prose-
cution within his district with respect to a pending charge or to a specific offense then known
to have been committed by the person.
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 48, Part F.3.
51. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991), the Supreme Court, while
finding the particular Nevada Supreme Court Rule void for vagueness, held that generally a rule
prohibiting an attorney in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement to the press does
not violate the First Amendment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the state-




we must also recognize that the present system has weaknesses. These
weaknesses transcend the mere need to defend the prosecutor's public
image; they pose threats to the public interest as well. A prosecutor
may immunize the wrong people as a result of misjudgment or even
corrupt motives. He may "pick people that he thinks he should get,
rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. '5 2 By ignoring
repeated offenses of a long-term informer, prosecutors may establish
unhealthy relationships and create the appearance that the offender has
a license to commit crimes. The intensity of the dilemmas, the lonely
position of the prosecutor, and the possibility of bad decisions are good
reasons for seeking some mechanism for review.
Three possibilities exist. First, we might wish to require that local
prosecutors obtain the consent of a high prosecuting official before en-
tering into a cooperation agreement. Federally, the government could
assimilate the procedure for cooperation agreements to the current for-
mal immunity grants procedure under which the prosecutor must ob-
tain the consent of an Assistant Attorney General. 3 Since informal
agreements often have much the same aim and impact as formal agree-
ments, one could make a strong principled case for this extension of the
practice.5 4 But there would be practical difficulties. The number of re-
quests by federal district offices for approval of informal immunity
grants or plea bargains in cooperation situations probably would run
into the thousands each year, and a requirement that a high-level offi-
cial clear every request would demand additional staffing of a special
office or some change in the present practice through devolution to re-
gional committees. In most states, on the other hand, where there is no
central prosecuting authority, the request would go no higher than the
office of the chief local prosecuting attorney.5 Another practical diffi-
culty would be that prosecutors often would need a speedy green light
52. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940).
53. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
54. The policy behind this proposal is that the higher the official, the broader the outlook
should be. With respect to formal immunity, the National Commission on Reform of the Federal
Criminal Law recognized this justification for requiring high-rank approval. The Commission
stated:
Is the public need for the particular testimony or documentary information in question so
great as to override the social cost of granting immunity and thereby possibly pardoning a
person who has violated the criminal law? Such a calculation can be made only by a person
familiar with the total range of law enforcement policies which would be affected by an immu-
nity grant, and not by one familiar only with the asserted public need in the particular case.
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: WORKING PAPERS 1433-34 (1970),
discussed in Sherman, supra note 13, at 61.
55. A district attorney may be the head of an office containing a staff of hundreds, covering a
district with a population of millions, or of an office containing fewer than ten attorneys in a
district with a population of thousands.
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in order to seize an opportunity and move quickly with a cooperator. In
the federal system, with so many cooperation negotiations, this might
create a substantial problem. A similar practice functions smoothly and
effectively with applications for electronic surveillance warrants,56 but
these occur much less frequently than would requests with respect to
cooperation agreements.
A second possibility would be to require judicial approval of coop-
eration agreements. We must be careful to define exactly what judicial
approval might mean. Under present practice, if there is a dispute over
whether either side has breached an agreement, a court may decide the
dispute, especially if one side, usually the government, seeks to avoid
fulfilling its promises. 57 Judicial review in this limited sense already ex-
ists. A stronger concept of judicial review would require the government
to submit any agreement to a court for approval before it goes forward
with eliciting information from a cooperating witness or having him tes-
tify. A court at this stage could consider the public interest by balanc-
ing the importance of the potential information and testimony against
the indulgence being granted to the cooperator. The court also could
scrutinize the agreement for any unconscionable clauses.5 8 It might in-
clude a colloquy with the cooperator, similar to the colloquy conducted
when a guilty plea is accepted,5 9 to ascertain whether the cooperator's
surrender of his Fifth Amendment rights was voluntary and intelligent.
No such judicial review is required for a grant of formal immunity,60
but one could argue that it is not necessary there because, with formal
immunity, the government irrevocably confers a precisely defined pro-
tection that is logically an exact equivalent of the constitutional guaran-
tee the immunized witness surrenders. Thus, by its very nature, the
transaction is fair and balanced. Informal immunity, by contrast, is
flexible enough to accommodate different shades of immunity and si-
multaneously is open-ended with respect to the kinds of obligations
that the cooperator may assume. It is also contingent on the coopera-
tor's keeping his promises. Its flexible shape contains the possibilities of
unconscionable clauses or agreements that are contrary to good public
56. The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988), provides that an application for an elec-
tronic surveillance warrant must be authorized by a Department of Justice officer of at least the
rank of Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, specially designated by the
Attorney General. The parallel New York statute confers the power to apply for an eavesdropping
warrant on any district attorney. N.Y. CiUX PROc. LAW §§ 700.05(5), 700.20(1) (McKinney 1984).
Federally, approval to apply for these warrants can be obtained very swiftly, once the initial paper
work is done, with the aid of facsimile machines and the telephone.
57. See infra notes part V.
58. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
59. See FED. R. CRIh. P. 11(c) and (d).
60. See discussion supra note 11.
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policy. Thus, there is a need for threshold review, especially with re-
spect to the voluntariness and intelligence of the cooperator's assump-
tion of obligations and waiver of rights.
While some courts have stated that an informal immunity deal will
not be binding without consent of the court,6 there are difficulties with
judicial regulation of cooperation agreements. The nature of the diffi-
culty depends in part on whether the agreement is for immunity or
whether it involves a guilty plea. In the case of the guilty plea, the
agreement must come before the court when the plea is tendered and
accepted. 2 But, under present practice, by the time the plea is ten-
dered to the court, the defendant likely has at least partly executed the
cooperation agreement by debriefing, or has executed it fully by testi-
mony before a grand jury or at a trial. A strong brand of judicial review,
thus, would require that the prosecutor submit the agreement to the
court before obtaining testimony or information from the defendant.
Even if this proceeding were sealed, it would be awkward and might
considerably disrupt existing prosecutorial techniques.
Current federal practice illustrates the kind of difficulty that might
arise from this stronger judicial review of cooperation agreements. Be-
cause the federal Sentencing Guidelines tie the range of sentences that
courts may impose rather tightly to the degree and nature of the
charges,63 it is now a frequent practice for the government to enter into
a plea agreement with a cooperator before the grand jury returns any
indictment. An important part of that agreement concerns the nature of
the charges that the government will seek from the grand jury and the
statement of facts that the government will present to the court. 4 To
61. See cases collected in Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Enforceability of Agreement by Law
Enforcement Officials Not to Prosecute if Accused Would Help in Criminal Investigation or
Would Become Witness Against Others, 32 A.L.R. 4TH 990, 995-97 (1984).
62. Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[i]f a plea agree-
ment has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the
agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered."
Under this Rule, if a cooperation agreement has been reduced to writing, it must be submitted to
the court when the plea is taken. There will be cases, however, in which there is ongoing coopera-
tion and the agreement has not been reduced to writing. If the defendant accepts a plea under
these circumstances, the prosecutor likely will tell the court only that the defendant is cooperating
and that the prosecutor may have later recommendations in the light of the cooperation.
63. The Guidelines are not written in terms of specific statutory offenses but in broader
terms descriptive of generic conduct. The starting point of an inquiry into the appropriate sen-
tence range is, nevertheless, an identification of which guideline covers the charged offense or
offenses.
64. In addition to offering a generic statement of the conduct that invokes a particular sen-
tence range, the Guidelines also contain listings of real offense elements such as the amount of
money taken, whether a gun was used, and so forth. These elements will have a mitigating or
aggravating impact on the sentence range. Courts can make further adjustments depending on
factors such as the defendant's role in the offense and whether the defendant accepted responsibil-
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assure judicial review before the cooperator incriminates himself, there-
fore, a court sometimes would have to review an agreement before the
grand jury returns any indictment. The procedure thus would be rather
different from the court's present inquiry when a plea is tendered.
While this procedure is not impossible to contemplate, it would be cum-
bersome and interrupt the flow and rhythm of the investigation unless
it could be completed very swiftly. At the same time, it would have no
great impact unless the court possessed strong discretion to refuse to
countenance the agreement on grounds of public policy and fairness.65
Judicial review of immunity agreements also would be an almost
complete innovation since these compacts presently are insulated from
scrutiny except in two limited situations. First, courts currently exercise
review over immunity agreements when litigation arises over the alleged
breach of a term in the agreement. At this point the court, while proba-
bly not examining the agreement's overall acceptability, will determine
the fair meaning of the term and whether there was a material breach."
Second, courts review immunity grants when the cooperator testifies at
a trial and discovery or cross-examination reveal the agreement. Here
the defense may allege that terms in the agreement taint the testimony
and make it inadmissible.6 7 This may trigger a narrow scrutiny, con-
fined to certain terms in the agreement and their impact on the cooper-
ator, only to determine the admissibility of his testimony.
Submission of immunity agreements for judicial approval before
execution thus would constitute a substantial change of practice, sub-
jecting the agreement, before implementation, to broad review based on
public interest and fairness. This practice would not be easy to enforce.
ity. Federal Sentencing Guideline § 6B1.4, reprinted in 18 U.S.C.S. app. (Law. Co-op. 1990), pro-
vides that a plea flowing from a plea agreement "may be accompanied by a written stipulation of
facts relevant to sentencing." Although the stipulation shall "not contain misleading facts," id. §
6B1.4(a)(2), the way in which it presents the facts may have a considerable impact on the final
calculation of the appropriate sentencing range under the Guidelines.
65. The federal system presently confers a power on the courts to review plea bargains. Rule
11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may accept or reject
an agreement that involves the dismissal of charges or the imposition of a specific sentence. In
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971), the Court said that a defendant has "no abso-
lute right to have a guilty plea accepted" and that a court "may reject a plea in exercise of sound
judicial discretion." No specific standards have been declared for the exercise of this discretion. A
few courts have asserted a broad discretion to disapprove pleas that appear too lenient. See United
States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1461-62 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700,
703-704 (5th Cir. 1977). Compare United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in
which the court concluded that a court's power to reject a guilty plea involving a reduction of the
initial charge is confined to cases where the "action of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure
from sound prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 622.
The court should only interfere in a "blatant and extreme case." Id.
66. See infra part V.
67. See infra part IV.
1991]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Absent testimony by the cooperator or subsequent litigation between
the cooperator and the government, the agreement would not inevitably
come to light. Judicial review, therefore, might depend on self-policing
by the prosecutor. The prosecutor would have to come to the court
every time she did not proceed against a suspect in return for coopera-
tion. The prosecutor would have little incentive to do this, at least in
cases where the cooperator will not testify, if she could secure the coop-
eration without the court's seal of approval. The cooperating suspect,
who would have the real interest in the court's validation of the ar-
rangement, often would not be in a strong position to insist on an
agreement's presentation to a court and, thus, would have to rely on the
prosecutor's good faith.
Since American law never has accepted the proposition that a pros-
ecutor has a general duty to prosecute every known offense, there are
currently no concepts or procedures by which a court can challenge or
investigate a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute suspects against
whom probable cause exists.6 8 Courts would have difficulty gathering
information to review a prosecutor's decision not to proceed when the
evidence might sustain a prosecution unless prosecutors had to keep
files with formal notations of their decision. 9 Cases involving testimony
are a large and important segment of immunity agreements and, in
those cases, the sanction of excluding the witness's testimony at trial
for failure to seek the court's prior approval of the agreement could
defend and enforce the requirement of judicial review before implemen-
tation of a cooperation agreement. However, this would likely be an
unacceptably strong sanction and would not reach the intractable diffi-
culty of undoing any advantages the prosecutor gained through infor-
mation provided by the cooperator.
Another possibility, very novel to American tradition but with at-
tractive potential, would be to require the prosecutor to file the details
of immunity agreements and plea agreements in major felony cases and
create a standing commission that would include lay persons not en-
gaged in prosecution to examine and report upon the agreements at reg-
ular intervals. The prosecutor's filings would include any written
agreement with the cooperator and also would contain information on
68. See supra note 45. See generally 2 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, at 160-207. Some
states have statutes that seem to require the prosecutor to proceed whenever she has cause. The
court in State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Naum, 318 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1984), relied upon such a statute
to force a prosecution by mandamus. The conventional position is put tersely in United States v.
Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976), in which the court stated
that "failure to seek court approval does not render the agreement unlawful," and concluded that
"[t]he decision of whether to prosecute rests in the Executive Branch."
69. See 2 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, at 174.
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any understandings, whether recorded or not, as to whether the cooper-
ator would participate in any future criminal activity as part of the
agreement. Standards and manuals for prosecutors' offices should con-
tain provisions on the policies and considerations a prosecutor should
weigh in drafting cooperation agreements"0 and should develop stan-
dard cooperation agreement forms. The reporting commission's com-
ments should contribute helpfully to the development of these
standards and agreement forms in greater detail than now provided by
the Principles of Federal Prosecution.
The strongest model of this innovation would require prosecutors
to submit cooperation agreements to the commission and receive its ad-
vice in all major cases. The commission's advice need not be binding
but would be part of what the prosecutor must consider before arriving
at an agreement. A weaker version of this innovation would require the
commission retrospectively to examine cooperation agreements in all
major cases and issue regular reports on the discharge of this
prosecutorial function.
A question that arises at this point is why cooperation agreements
deserve special scrutiny as opposed to plea bargains in general. One
could certainly make an argument for review by a public commission of
all plea bargains in major cases, but plea bargains involving cooperation
agreements constitute a good starting point. Cooperation agreements
are special because the extended leniency or immunity often does not
rest, even in part, on any reduced culpability in the commission of a
crime. Also, they sometimes carry a special danger of licensing continu-
ing criminal acts. Simultaneously, no doubt because of the absence of
any approval or review process, cooperation agreements are not stan-
dardized or governed by a detailed set of rules, but instead tend to be
individually composed and may vary in important ways even from dis-
trict to district in the federal system. The proper protection of the pub-
lic interest and fairness in the administration of justice thus are
implicated with a special sharpness. Ventilation and examination of
these agreements by a public body outside the prosecutorial bureau-
cracy might have a healthy impact that later could be extended to a
wider range of plea bargains.
The commission might review and comment on the following is-
sues: (1) the development of standards for identifying situations in
which granting full immunity appears inappropriate; (2) framing crite-
ria for what should be permissible and impermissible conditions of




achievement attaching to the cooperation; 1 (3) suggesting standards for
when it is proper to immunize the cooperator with respect to the com-
mission of future crimes;72 and (4) developing criteria for what should
constitute a substantial breach of an agreement by a cooperator and
when prosecutors should consider completing cooperation despite a
breach."3
Any proposal for review or monitoring of a prosecutor's decision to
enter into a cooperation agreement with a witness suffers from the risk
of imposing unhelpful rigidity on what is often a very flexible process.
Currently prosecutors (and investigating agents) sometimes prefer to
avoid or hold off on immunity agreements because the continuing sus-
pense might strengthen their influence over the witness. Prosecutors,
thus, often will not reduce an agreement to writing and will provide
only vague assurances to the witness or informer that he will benefit
from continued cooperation.
Under present practice no fixed time exists at which the prosecutor
must reduce the agreement to writing. In some cases the discussion may
proceed swiftly and neatly so that there is an early, precise understand-
ing of what will be exchanged and, consequently, an early framing of a
written compact. In many cases, however, the process is less tidy and
much more protracted. A potential cooperator may go through numer-
ous interviews, first with agents and then with prosecutors, during
which the cooperator, the agents, and the prosecutors may slowly clarify
the dimensions and value of his cooperation. The extent of the immu-
nity or leniency offered similarly may remain undefined during these
early stages. Indeed, agents and prosecutors often will prefer to keep
the degree of leniency imprecise until the end or close to the end of the
cooperator's expected contribution. 4 A new rule requiring that coopera-
71. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
72. Prosecutors sometimes use cooperators most productively by allowing them to continue
to operate in a criminal organization while relaying information and perhaps setting up certain
situations favorable to government investigation. It may be impossible for cooperators to do this
kind of work without committing certain offenses. A very sensitive question is where to draw lines
with respect to what criminal acts public policy can condone for these ends. All presumably would
agree that the government should never allow crimes of violence or the irreversible infliction of loss
on an individual under cooperation agreements. Some situations are more controversial. For exam-
ple, should the government immunize a cooperator for contemplated participation in narcotics
felonies if this appears to be the only way to build a case against persistent, major offenders?
73. See infra notes 196-216 and accompanying text.
74. A prosecutor may prefer not to have a written agreement that makes precise promises
because its absence may strengthen the position of the witness before a jury. The witness will be
able to say truthfully that, while he has a general assurance of leniency if he cooperates, the gov-
ernment has made no promises to him with respect to the exact extent of the leniency. If the
prosecutor has a trustworthy and generous track record in this area, a cooperating witness's coun-
sel may advise him that it is safe and even advantageous to proceed without a written agreement,
since, if he does his best for the government, the prosecutor ultimately may give him a greater
[Vol. 45:1
1991] AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
tion agreements be submitted for approval or scrutiny, if faithfully
complied with, would have an inevitable tendency to direct the present
varying and fluid process into harder channels and would considerably
formalize the proceedings, compelling the reduction of the agreement to
writing at an early stage. A fundamental question, therefore, is whether
the gains from innovation would be outweighed by the loss in
prosecutorial flexibility and freedom of maneuver. There is also a risk
that a review requirement simply would drive cooperation understand-
ings underground and thus increase the occurrence of agreements that
are contrary to public policy.75
IV. FAIRNESS TO THE DEFENDANT
Conventionally our judicial system has relied primarily on the de-
fense's adversarial capacity to reveal a cooperation agreement and ex-
pose its significance in cross-examination and in summation. Some
courts may also supplement the defense's actions with a corroboration
requirement for accomplice testimony or a charge to the jury on the
importance of weighing the cooperator's testimony carefully. 7 In mod-
ern times these protections have been strengthened by the prosecutor's
duty, in response to a properly framed request, to disclose to the de-
fense the promises made to the witness, Breach of this duty may
amount to a due process violation requiring the reversal of a
conviction. 77
Beyond disclosure and confrontation, there is the possibility that
some kinds of cooperation agreements will render testimony tainted
and its use a violation of a defendant's due process rights. This possibil-
reward than the prosecutor would have promised in a written agreement at an early stage.
75. Prosecutors are unlikely to be pleased with the establishment of a commission to which
they would have a duty to report cooperation agreements. They may feel that there are security
risks in reporting certain information to the commission while simultaneously recognizing that
they cannot properly defend the agreement as in the public interest without forwarding that infor-
mation. They thus would be afraid of unfair criticism.
76. "The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a
witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by
a properly instructed jury." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966). In Hoffa the trial
court admitted the testimony of an informer who, among other rewards for his information and
testimony, had federal and state charges against him dropped. The Court observed: "The peti-
tioner is quite correct in the contention that Partin, perhaps even more than most informers, may
have had motives to lie. But it does not follow that his testimony was untrue, nor does it follow
that his testimony was constitutionally inadmissible." Id. at 311. The Court held in Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941), that an agreement whereby an accomplice received a reduced
sentence in return for testifying was not a violation of the due process clause.
77. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972), the Court held that nondisclosure of an immunity grant to a witness who testified against
the defendant violated due process because there was an issue of the witness's credibility. This
followed the earlier decision, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), to the same effect.
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ity probably flows from the old common-law principle that confessions
are involuntary when procured by promises or threats from a person in
authority." By analogy, one could argue that testimony is inadmissible
when a witness who is in the position of a virtual defendant testifies in
hopes of receiving leniency. Some courts have held that agreements for
leniency or immunity that require a witness to testify in a particular
fashion or are contingent on results (procuring indictments or convic-
tions) are a violation of the due process rights of the defendant against
whom the testimony is offered.
In 1884 the Texas Court of Appeals roundly condemned an ar-
rangement by which the State promised to drop charges against one or
another of six suspects depending on which of them gave the most pro-
ductive testimony before the grand jury.7 As the court moderately ob-
served, this arrangement for immunity by public competition could
induce a witness to swear to "any and all things" and was worse than a
bribe.80 Much more recently a California appellate court reversed a con-
viction on the ground that a witness against the defendant had been
promised immunity on condition that his testimony at the trial did
"not materially or substantially change" from prior recorded statements
that he had made to the police.8 "[A] defendant," the court observed,
"is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially
upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either
by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in
a particular fashion. 8s2 1
A few courts have tried to curb the dangers of perjured testimony
by requiring that the State execute its promises to the witness before he
testifies. This essentially means that a court must sentence the witness
under a plea agreement before he testifies or treat a promise of immu-
nity as irrevocable. 3 Otherwise, the testifying witness still expects his
78. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 H~Av. L. REV. 935, 954-59 (1966).
79. Harris v. State, 15 Tex. App. 629 (1884).
80. Id. at 634.
81. People v. Medina, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
82. Id. at 145. In People v. Green, 228 P.2d 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951), an accomplice
gave testimony at the preliminary hearing with a promise of leniency if the testimony resulted in
the defendant's being bound over for trial. At the trial the witness recanted and his preliminary
hearing testimony was admitted over objection. The appellate court described the agreement as an
"astonishing bargain," id. at 867, and went on to reverse the conviction, saying that such testimony
was "tainted beyond redemption." Id. at 871 (quoting Rex v. Robinson, 30 B.C.R. 369, 375 (British
Columbia, 1921)).
83. In Franklin v. State, 577 P.2d 860 (Nev. 1978), an accomplice witness in a murder prose-
cution bargained to escape the risk of a death sentence by pleading to second degree murder. The
witness was not allowed to plead until after he had testified at the defendant's preliminary hear-
ing, and sentence was not imposed on the witness until after the defendant had been convicted.
The Nevada court reversed on the ground that this practice created such a risk of perjury that it
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"fee" and the prosecution is tainted by the appearance of purchasing or
coercing testimony.8 4 From the State's perspective, the obvious danger
is that the witness may not give the testimony expected once he has
irrevocably procured the benefit of the bargain. 5 In that situation, how-
ever, the State may still be able to revoke the plea 6 and perhaps prose-
cute for perjury, so that the prosecutor may still "keep a hammer" over
the witness.8 7
In any case, the great weight of modern authority, particularly in
the federal courts, is that, in guilty-plea cases, the postponement of
plea and sentence is unobjectionable. Federal courts consistently have
refused to find a due process violation in this practice and have viewed
the traditional safeguards of cross-examination, summation, and the
court's charge to the jury as adequate for exposing the possibilities of
perjury." At the same time, the suggestion of some older cases that an
agreement with a witness should only demand full and truthful testi-
mony and should in no way be contingent on the success of the prosecu-
tion89 seems to have crumbled. In the analogous situation of testimony
by informants, federal courts have held that the informant's anticipated
receipt of money if his testimony resulted in a conviction did not render
violated the defendant's right to due process.
84. See id. at 862, 863.
85. In LaPena v State, 643 P.2d 244 (Nev. 1982), the witness was allowed to plead to second
degree murder with a promised sentence of five years to life. He testified against the defendant at
the preliminary hearing and then was sentenced under the bargain. At the defendant's trial the
witness recanted and his preliminary hearing testimony was admitted. The appellate court re-
versed on the ground that his preliminary hearing testimony was suspect because of the pending
inducement.
86. The witness would have promised to testify fully and truthfully. If his trial testimony
contradicted his testimony at the preliminary hearing, he broke his promise at one or the other of
these proceedings and so, presumably, the State would be entitled to have the plea vacated. This
seems at the least to be constitutionally permissible. See the discussion of Ricketts v. Adamson,
483 U.S. 1 (1987), infra notes 229-45 and accompanying text.
87. This was how the prosecutor expressed his intentions at a hearing held in Franklin, 577
P.2d at 863 n.5.
88. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 198-99 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Kimble,
719 F.2d 1253, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); United States v. Bor-
man, 437 F.2d 44, 45-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. Insana, 423
F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 871 (1970); United States v. Vida, 370 F.2d 759,
767 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 910 (1966).
89. The First Circuit in United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981), sug-
gested that testimony might be tainted if leniency is dependent on its evaluation by the govern-
ment. The Eighth Circuit made the same suggestion in United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228,
1230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976). A rare federal case in which a court found testi-
mony tainted and inadmissible on contingency grounds is United States v. Baresh, 595 F. Supp.
1132, 1134-37 (S.D. Texas 1984), in which the government promised the witness immunity and
permission to keep assets derived from narcotics dealing if he would give information and testi-
mony leading to the conviction of two specified defendants. After his testimony had been admit-
ted, and in the absence of any corroboration, the court declared a mistrial.
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him incompetent to testify;"0 that it was proper to admit the testimony
of an informant who was a convicted felon and who had been paid for
results rather than simply for information; 1 and that it was proper to
allow the testimony of undercover agents who worked under an agree-
ment providing that their compensation was to be fixed after trial "on
the basis of an appraisal of the extent and quality of [their] work. '92
A contrary tendency briefly appeared in Williamson v. United
States.9 In that case the government agreed to pay an informer, who
became a witness,9" if he could detect a pretargeted individual commit-
ting a crime. The former Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction because
of the enhanced risk of entrapment. 5 The Williamson decision, how-
ever, was repudiated elsewhere, interpreted restrictively in the former
Fifth Circuit, and ultimately reversed.96 Courts rejected Williamson for
several reasons. First, they noted the alleged importance to law enforce-
ment of specific contracts with informers, even if they became wit-
nesses. Second, courts have expressed confidence that the adversarial
process adequately enables the jury to weigh the witness's credibility.
Indeed, the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Bagley,97 while
not confronting this issue squarely, suggests that there is no impropri-
ety in designating targets in agreements for information and testimony
made with paid informers.9 '
The cases noted above, however, did not involve cooperation agree-
ments but rather dealt with paid informants who became witnesses. A
question remains as to whether a witness's testimony is more deeply
tainted when the contingency involves not simply a cash payment but
90. United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545, 546-47 (11th Cir. 1984).
91. Heard v. United States, 414 F.2d 854, 886 (5th Cir. 1969).
92. United States v. Crim, 340 F.2d 989, 990 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
93. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962).
94. Although this is not made clear in the opinion, a deposition by the informer in William-
son was admitted into evidence at the trial. See United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 (11th
Cir. 1987) (court's analysis of the Williamson transcript).
95. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 444.
96. Williamson was interpreted narrowly in United States v. McClure, 577 F.2d 1021, 1022-
23 (5th Cir. 1978), and was rejected in United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 199-200 (1st Cir.
1985), United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971),
United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1978), and in United States v. Hodge, 594 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1979). It was overruled by the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987).
97. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
98. In Bagley the government had agreed to pay informers (state law enforcement officers
and private security guards) lump sums for the provision of information regarding violations com-
mitted by Bagley and for testifying against Bagley in federal court. Although the issue presented
in Bagley was whether there should be reversal for failure by the prosecutor to disclose the agree-
ments in full to the defense, there is no suggestion in the opinion that the agreements themselves
necessarily tainted the witness's testimony to the point of rendering it inadmissible. The Court
appeared to take it for granted that the testimony was properly admitted.
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immunity or leniency in some criminal matter. In one notable piece of
litigation in this area, United States v. Waterman," the government
agreed to give a witness a twelve-year sentence if he cooperated. The
district court found that the agreement entailed a promise that the gov-
ernment would make a further motion for the reduction of the witness's
sentence if he gave truthful testimony before the grand jury that led to
further indictments. 100 The government in fact did move to reduce the
sentence after the witness testified before the grand jury, the defendant
was indicted, and the witness again testified at the defendant's trial.
A panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this
agreement amounted to an offer of favorable treatment contingent on
the success of the prosecution and, thus, reversed the conviction. The
court noted that, while the agreement went only to grand jury testi-
mony, the pressure for the defendant to stick to the same story at the
trial was very strong.101 The court suggested that this was an "invita-
tion to perjury."102 Although the jury was aware of the terms of the
agreement, the court declared that there is "no place in due process law
for positioning the jury to weed out the seeds of untruth planted by the
government. "10 This check on the scope of such agreements was over-
turned, however, when, on a rehearing, the en banc court divided
equally without any opinion, thus restoring the conviction. Although
this outcome deprives the decision of any precedential value, it exem-
plifies a trend in the federal courts toward greater freedom for the pros-
ecution to tie inducements more closely to performance in cooperation
agreements. 04
Subsequent to Waterman the First Circuit considered the impact
of a set of plea agreements in which the government offered cooperating
witnesses sentence concessions the dimensions of which were to be fixed
at a later date, "depending principally upon the value to the Govern-
ment of the defendant's cooperation." 105 While suggesting that the gov-
ernment in the future include in plea agreements a clause stating that
giving false information or testimony would be considered a failure to
99. 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1984) (panel and en banc decisions), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065
(1985).
100. Id. at 1530.
101. Id. at 1531.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1532.
104. This is now reinforced by changes in sentencing laws that restrict the motion for reduc-
tion of sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to one made by the
government on the ground of the defendant's cooperation. Formerly, defendants routinely made
motions for reduction, and the Rules did not restrict the motion to any specific ground. Giving the
government a monopoly over the motion puts even greater pressure on cooperating witnesses to
perform up to expectations and to secure results. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
105. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 194 (1st Cir. 1985).
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cooperate fully,10 6 the court found that the nature of the agreement did
not taint the testimony.' ° The court stated that it was in agreement
with the essential policy contained in a Sixth Circuit opinion where
that court had said:
[There is no overriding policy to exclude the testimony of an informant if he is paid
under] a contingent fee agreement for the conviction of specified persons for crimes
not yet committed. Although it is true that the informant working under this type
of arrangement may be prone to lie and manufacture crimes, he is no more likely to
commit these wrongs than witnesses acting for other, more common reasons ...
Rather than adopting an exclusionary rule for a particular factual situation,. . . we
prefer the rule that would leave the entire matter to the jury to consider in weigh-
ing the credibility of the witness-informant. (Citation omitted). In our view this
approach provides adequate safeguards for the criminal defendant against possible
abuses since the witness must undergo the rigors of cross-examination. 10 8
Recent cases have confirmed this trend. In United States v. Ris-
ken'0 9 the informant-witness, who was not an accomplice receiving im-
munity or leniency, reached an understanding with the government
whereby the government might give the witness a post-trial payment
depending on whether there was a conviction. The court found no con-
stitutional objection to the testimony. In United States v. Wilson"0 the
government promised the witnesses, who were cooperators, immunity
and, in addition, notified them that they were eligible to receive mil-
lions of dollars from the United States for aiding in the detection and
punishment of tax offenders depending on testimony they gave at the
trial."" The court of appeals held that, since there had been full disclo-
sure and a cautionary instruction had been given, the testimony was
unobjectionable." 2 These decisions invite an appraisal of the present
106. Id. at 200.
107. Other cases in which courts found testimony to be properly admitted under agreements
that promised leniency according to the government's evaluation of the worth of the testimony are
United States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987),
and United States v. Fallon, 776 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1985).
108. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1985) (alterations in original)
(quoting United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 395-96 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989
(1971)). The Sixth Circuit was dealing in this passage, however, with informant testimony and not
with testimony in return for leniency.
109. 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
110. 904 F.2d 656 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3264 (1991).
111. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by statute "to pay such sums... as he
may deem necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating
the internal revenue laws . . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (1988).
112. The instruction given was in the usual terms and ran:
The testimony of an alleged accomplice, and the testimony of one who provides evidence
against a defendant as an informer for pay or for immunity from punishment or for personal
advantage or vindication, must always be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care
and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses ....
Wilson, 904 F.2d at 659-60. In this case the argument might be made that the inducement is in no
way objectionable since the prospect of financial reward comes from a general statute and not from
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state of the law with respect to the testimony of cooperators.
A. Safeguards Against Perjured Testimony
While it may not be necessary for courts to apply a general exclu-
sionary rule to testimony and fruits resulting from cooperation agree-
ments, these agreements present specially sensitive situations because it
is the government that extends inducements for a witness to lie. When
the government either creates or sharply enhances its own witness's mo-
tivation to lie, adversarial equipoise calls for special safeguards to pro-
tect defendants. These safeguards might take a variety of forms.
First, there is a need to clarify and strengthen the defendant's
rights to discovery and the prospect of postconviction relief in the ab-
sence of proper discovery.11 3 In practice, the discovery of a cooperation
agreement is often not difficult for the defense. Not infrequently it will
be evident well before the trial that the witness, who initially may have
been or who may remain a codefendant, is cooperating with the govern-
ment. The defense typically will prepare to meet the witness's testi-
mony. Part of the preparation will include a request to the government
for the details of any cooperation agreement with the witness and for
the witness's criminal record. The prosecution generally will provide
this information and might, of course, be compelled to do so, on appli-
cation by the defense, under the Brady principle which, as a matter of
due process, requires the government to disclose any material exculpa-
tory information to the defense. 4 The federal practice is to make sua
sponte disclosure of cooperation agreements.1 1 5
There will, however, be some cases in which the government either
through reluctance or mistake fails adequately to disclose a cooperation
or a reward agreement. If this failure becomes an assignment of error
on appeal, it will be imperative to know the exact scope of the defend-
ant's discovery rights. The matter is not free from difficulty since the
Supreme Court seriously eroded the Brady principle in United States
a specific promise made by the government to induce cooperation in a particular case. The statute
evinces a general congressional policy to induce information and testimony by the prospect of
financial reward in tax cases. But it seems inappropriate that the prosecution may tell witnesses
that whether they will receive the bounty depends to an extent on the nature of their testimony.
Further, in Wilson the prosecutor made an additional promise of immunity. Id. at 658.
113. See Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment Made to
Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARv. L. RE v. 887 (1981).
114. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
115. Where an accomplice who has made a plea bargain testifies, the federal rule is that the
court should inform the jury of the exact nature of the agreement and instruct the jury to weigh
the accomplice's testimony carefully. United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1971). Federal prosecutors make a practice, even in the absence of a
specific request under Brady, of disclosing such agreements to the defense.
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v. Bagley."" In Bagley the Court effectively indicated that a prosecu-
tor's suppression of information about inducements held out to govern-
ment witnesses will not be a ground for reversal absent a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different had the sup-
pressed information been available."' Bagley is a formidable obstacle
to postconviction relief. It also may fortify any trial court tendencies to
restrict discovery and may encourage the prosecution to make less than
full disclosure." 8
Bagley was not a case of failure to disclose a promise of leniency to
a cooperating witness, but, insofar as it may apply to such cases, state
courts should revise or reject the Bagley principle under their state con-
stitutions. The principle is indefensible in light of the specific require-
ments of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. Confrontation,
the right to the effective assistance of counsel in pursuing confronta-
tion, and independent general due process considerations demand that
in all cases of cooperation the government make full pretrial disclosure
to the defense. 1 9 Courts should not permit the government to induce
its witnesses to lie, fail to disclose the inducements, and then escape
116. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
117. In Bagley the defendant made a pretrial request to the prosecutor for information on
"any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony." Id. at
669-70. The response did not disclose any inducements. After conviction the defendant discovered
that two principal witnesses against him had entered into agreements under which the government
had promised to "pay to said vendor a sum commensurate with services and information ren-
dered." Id. at 671. The agreement specified that the witness would provide information on the
defendant. As a result, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendant's motion to vacate his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the government's appeal of the
decision to vacate. Although the defendant had made a specific request for the suppressed infor-
mation, the Court found that he was not entitled to reversal of his conviction unless there was "a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different." Id. at 682. Other cases holding that incomplete disclosure of
fee arrangements with government witnesses are not material are United States v. Janis, 831 F.2d
773 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1073 (1988), and United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
118. Bagley is a serviceable test for appellate courts reviewing a conviction, but it is awkward
for trial courts to apply. If a trial court is confronted before trial with the propriety of a defense
demand for discovery, the judge presumably still must apply the Brady standard of "materiality"
but with the gloss given by Bagley. The question of whether the result of the proceeding would be
different (that is, would any guilty verdict probably not have been returned), however, is difficult
to answer when no evidence has yet been presented. The knowledge of the appellate court's re-
viewing standard nonetheless will likely cause trial courts to make rulings unfavorable to the
defense.
119. The Supreme Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987), to the
effect that confrontation is primarily an in-trial doctrine going to the scope of cross-examination is
distinguishable. Richie was a case of h defense subpoena addressed to a state agency to obtain
records protected under a confidentiality statute. This reasoning may not apply when the very
subject matter as to which a need for confrontation arises is created entirely by the government for
the sole purpose of gaining a stronger position at the trial.
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reversal on the grounds that disclosure would not have produced a dif-
ferent result. When the government is exclusively responsible for creat-
ing a need-to-know situation as to confrontation, the proper standard
should be harmless error, with the usual burden of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt on the government. The potential for grave prejudice
through nondisclosure in any particular case and the systemic need to
monitor cooperation agreements necessitates placing that burden on the
government. 120
If clear rules for automatic full disclosure are the first necessary
safeguard, the next question is whether special evidentiary rules also
are needed. The cooperating witness, whether immunized or the recipi-
ent of a favorable bargain, is often an accomplice of the defendant
against whom he testifies. Although some jurisdictions require accom-
plice testimony to be corroborated,12 the federal system and many
states have no such rule. 22 Federal courts generally agree, however,
120. In addition to discovery under a due process or confrontation requirement, any prior
statements by the cooperating witness that relate to his testimony at the trial will be discoverable
after he testifies under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1985); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2, or
under a comparable state provision. These provisions extend to grand jury testimony by the wit-
ness but may not cover statements that the witness made in interviews with agents unless these
were memorialized in a way that qualifies them as recorded statements for the purposes of the
statute. Agents and the prosecutor often may refrain from verbatim recording of statements in
order to take them outside the provisions of the statute.
121. A recent survey shows that 16 states have accomplice corroboration statutes. Christine
J. Saverda, Note, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100
YALz L.J. 785, 791 n.40 (1990). For example, § 60.22(1) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law
(1981) provides: "A defendant may not be convicted of any offense upon the testimony of an ac-
complice unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the com-
mission of such offense." This corroborative evidence must be "truly independent," People v.
Hudson, 414 N.E.2d 385, 387 (N.Y. 1980), and "[i]t may not depend for its weight and probative
value upon the testimony of the accomplice." People v. Kress, 31 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1940). The
New York court stated in Hudson:
The objective of the statute is not to require bolstering of the testimony of the accomplice as
a witness or to lend credibility to the details of his testimony; rather the purpose of the
statute is to protect the defendant against the risk of a motivated fabrication, to insist on
proof other than that alone which originates from a possibly unreliable or self-interested
accomplice.
Hudson, 414 N.E.2d at 388.
122. Federal courts have declared that neither the United States Constitution nor the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure require corroboration of accomplice testimony. United States v.
Gardea, 830 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that "[a] conviction may rest solely on the uncor-
roborated testimony of one accomplice if the testimony is not insubstantial on its face"); Jacobs v.
Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980) (stating that "uncorrobo-
rated accomplice testimony may constitutionally provide the exclusive basis for a criminal convic-
tion" (quoting United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1060 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927
(1971)). Early this century, the Supreme Court apparently viewed accomplice testimony nega-
tively, saying that it "ought to be received with suspicion, and with the very greatest care and
caution, and ought not to be passed upon by the jury under the same rules governing other and
apparently credible witnesses." Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909). But soon
thereafter the Court came to accept accomplice testimony, even in the absence of a cautionary
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that a cautionary instruction is desirable and should be given when
requested.12
3
While a corroboration requirement has a superficial common-sense
appeal, it likely would not significantly protect the defendant when co-
operating witnesses give key testimony. If courts understand corrobora-
tion as some independent evidence of the defendant's participation in
the crime, this evidence usually will be forthcoming. In cases of cooper-
ating witnesses, however, the absence of any other evidence is usually
not as disturbing as the overwhelming, scale-tilting weight of the coop-
erating witness's testimony. The mere production of a second witness or
second piece of evidence does not cure the suspect testimony at the
heart of the prosecution's case. If courts understand corroboration in a
weaker sense as evidence that strengthens the credibility of the witness
without independently implicating the accused as to the offense, this
evidence too will usually be readily available since the prosecutor easily
can implicate the witness in the criminal activity. This implication will
qualify the witness as having access to special knowledge and thus cor-
roborate his credibility. 124 Thus, while a corroboration requirement
would add a small measure of assurance, 25 it would not go to the heart
of the problem of how best to guard against the suspect quality of in-
former or cooperating witness testimony.
A familiar safeguard is the special charge to the jury. The Supreme
Court has not spoken decisively on the need for a special charge, either
constitutionally or in the context of the federal criminal system. In On
Lee v. United States 26 the Court acknowledged the need for "careful
instruction, with equanimity. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917); Holm-
gren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 524 (1910). See also Note, supra note 121, at 792-95.
123. The Supreme Court has never announced a requirement of corroboration but has made
several comments on the need to treat accomplice testimony with caution. The Court has stated:
The use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other betrayals
which are "dirty business" may raise serious questions of credibility. To the extent that they
do, a defendant is entitled to broad latitude to probe credibility by cross-examination and to
have the issues submitted to the jury with careful instructions.
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952). The Court also has noted that when the prose-
cution calls an accused accomplice to testify against the defendant, "[c]ommon sense would sug-
gest that [the witness] often has a greater interest in lying in favor of the prosecution rather than
against it, especially if he is still awaiting his own trial or sentencing." Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 22 (1967). See also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103 (1972) (recognizing that
"[a]ccomplice instructions have long been in use and have been repeatedly approved," and sug-
gesting that "[i]n most instances, they represent no more than a commonsense recognition that an
accomplice may have a special interest in testifying, thus casting doubt upon his veracity").
124. See R. v. Farler, 173 Eng. Rep. 418, 419 (1837) (stating that an accomplice "will always
be able to relate the facts of the case, and if the confirmation be only on the truth of that history,
without identifying the persons, that is really no corroboration at all").
125. Corroboration requirements thus would be a welcome requirement in all cases of bought
testimony whether or not the witness was an accomplice of the defendant.
126. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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instructions" when there are questions as to the credibility of accom-
plice testimony. The Court expanded on this remark in Cool v. United
States127 by noting that cautionary instructions as to accomplice testi-
mony represented a common sense and traditional practice. The Court
has not indicated, however, when the omission of such instructions
might constitute reversible error.
Federal courts typically instruct juries to weigh and scrutinize ac-
complice testimony with great care.128 Some courts have held that the
omission of this instruction constitutes reversible error when there was
no corroborating evidence and the evidence of guilt was not overwhelm-
ing." ' The adequacy of the caution's present form is doubtful when, as
is usually the case, the benefits expected by the cooperating witness are
as yet unrealized and depend upon his continued cooperation. Courts
should instruct juries to consider how easily suspects with inside knowl-
edge can fabricate testimony and the strong incentive for suspects to do
so when their liberty may depend on it. A defense summation likely will
make these points vigorously, but that is not a substitute for a charge
by the court.
B. The Case for Exclusion
If full disclosure, adversarial cross-examination and summation,
and a strong charge to the jury cannot guard adequately against the
dangers of perjury by cooperating witnesses, then the only alternative
would be an exclusionary rule barring such testimony. Nonetheless,
general application of the radical remedy of automatic exclusion is not
justifiable. Testimony is frequently not disinterested. Victims and their
families and friends may seek revenge by embellishing their testimony.
A victim may shape testimony out of a desire for restitution, and with
recent developments in the law, a victim's testimony at a criminal trial
may secure a conviction that will fortify a subsequent civil claim by the
victim for treble damages."'
Courts generally do not bar witnesses simply because they are ene-
mies of the defendant or stand to gain from his conviction. The expec-
tation of some gain or pleasure from an outcome hardly makes it sure
127. 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
128. See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Necessity of, and Prejudicial Effect of Omitting,
Cautionary Instructions to Jury as to Accomplice's Testimony Against Defendant in Federal
Criminal Trial, 17 ALR FED. 249, 263 (1973).
129. See id.
130. This is a common result under the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1984), and always
has been possible under the antitrust laws. See Howard P. Marvel, Jeffry M. Netter & Anthony M.




or even probable that a person is lying. The paths of truth and advan-
tage do not always diverge. If these motives did bar testimony there
often would be no competent witnesses. Furthermore, the defense has
the opportunity to educate the jury thoroughly on all the possible mo-
tives to commit perjury. Law enforcement's success always has de-
pended heavily on criminals' willingness to cut each other's throats.
The offer of inducements traditionally has enhanced this willingness.
Cotirts should not deny juries the opportunity to hear testimony that is
very often decisive and true, nor should they deny society this most
useful tool for convicting the guilty. A substantial number of valid con-
victions would be lost if these practices were forbidden.
Even if courts generally allow a cooperator to testify, they must
still face the question of what might constitute a "worst case" situation
in which the danger of concoction is so strong that courts should ex-
clude the testimony.3 1 As noted above, some courts earlier concluded
that testimony should be excluded when leniency or immunity for the
witness was conditioned on a raw result (conviction or indictment of the
defendant), or when the government attached a condition that testi-
mony replicate earlier testimony or information given to the police or
prosecutor in an interview.13 2 As also noted above, however, there is a
movement in the federal cases away from this position toward an easier
admission of testimony.133
There are attractive arguments to the effect that the tendency to-
ward easier admission of testimony is misconceived and should be re-
versed, at least in the strongest cases in which the government
conditions immunity or leniency on testimony leading to the indictment
or conviction of a pretargeted individual. It may be unobjectionable to
condition the payment of a reward for information on some affirmative
result. The notion that a reward will be paid only if the information
leads to an arrest or conviction is familiar. Even when the contract for
information designates a particular target, as to whom there must be a
successful outcome, the risk to the innocent does not become unaccept-
able.13 The practice is arguably a necessary tool of law enforcement,
131. See Yvette A. Beaman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agree-
ments, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800 (1987).
132. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
134. Information contracts contingent on results are now a common practice and courts have
had no problems with them. Appellants sometimes attack these contracts on the ground that the
government is guilty of "outrageous" conduct, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1973), but courts have not been receptive. See United States v. Valona, 834 F.2d 1334, 1343 (7th
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[ilt is clear that situations, as in the present case, which involve pre-
targeting of a defendant. . . and a contingent fee arrangement, do not call for the activation and
application of the outrageous conduct concept").
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and the government has to transform the information into testimony by
competent witnesses or relevant evidence subject to the adversarial
process.
When the information giver is also to be a witness, however, the
designation of targets and the demand for results before payment are
much more suspect because the quality of testimony before a jury or
grand jury is at issue. Due process considerations control with respect
to the conduct of the trial. Courts should permit the government to
offer inducements only within the compass of its generally proper exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion. To bargain for the truth is traditionally
within this range; to bargain for results is not. Telling the truth is a
normal obligation for all witnesses. Getting results is clearly not a nor-
mal or proper witness obligation. It is inconceivable that a witness who
was not a suspect or defendant should be punished for not getting a
result. Punishing a witness who tells the truth but does not get the
prosecutor's desired result is analogous to punishing juries who acquit.
In due process terms, it is crucial to emphasize that the temptation
to lie in cooperation agreement cases is not just a natural feature of the
landscape but specifically is introduced or inflated by the government
when it offers immunity or leniency in return for cooperation. Accom-
plices, if they give information or testify, may have a natural tendency
to lie in order to minimize their part in the crime. A promise of leniency
in exchange for cooperation surely enhances that tendency. The ques-
tion then becomes whether we should tolerate yet a further increment
of pressure by allowing the government to impose a specific contingency
requirement. A requirement of procuring an indictment or conviction
strongly indicates the nature and quality of the testimony that the gov-
ernment expects. The witness is being crudely told that he will get no
reward unless his testimony is of a certain nature. This imposes a very
high degree of pressure and influence and, thus, should render the testi-
mony tainted. These practices weaken the concept of the trial as a
truth-finding process and disturb the adversarial equipoise since the de-
fendant has no similar weapons with which to cajole testimony.' Even
if the outcome condition is coupled with a condition that the witness
always tell the truth, the former is likely to loom larger. Courts should
hold, therefore, that contingency requirements taint the testimony irre-
trievably.136 As Sir Matthew Hale reminded us, we often are dealing
135. See Note, supra note 131.
136. A sample of a plea agreement in return for cooperation, embodying some of the condi-
tions under discussion, is provided in 5 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 11 (1991). The agreement, drafted
by a Maryland prosecutor, binds the defendant to give truthful cooperation and to testify truth-
fully before the grand jury, but also contains the following clause:
That the defendant agrees that he will cooperate with the police in a manner that leads to the
1991]
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here with "desperate villains ' 13 7 whose disposition to tell the truth may
be weak enough without demanding that their testimony produce re-
sults and subjecting them to severe penalties in the event of failure.
Additionally, contingency requirements violate ethical rules. The
Model Code of Professional Responsibility forbids the "payment of
compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony
or the outcome of the case."'183 As one federal judge observed in a deci-
sion that upheld the admission of contingent fee testimony for the
government:
The prosecuting attorney is therefore permitted to adduce evidence in a criminal
case despite the fact that it is gained by a breach of ethical standards.. . . If the
government may do so, the defendant presumably may also employ experts and
other witnesses to testify for a fee contingent on his acquittal. While this balances
opportunity equally, it patently permits perversion of the trial process .... 139
In sum, the dangers of perjured testimony are already so great that
they should not be underscored by unethical promises contingent on
securing an indictment or a conviction, especially when the reward to
the witness is immunity or leniency. This type of specific contingency in
the agreement either should lead courts to exclude the testimony or
should become a ground for reversal if a court allowed the testimony
indictment of the following four (4) individuals [individuals are then named].. . . Any indict-
ment of [A] must be for a minimum of one (1) kilo of cocaine. If for whatever reason insuffi-
cient evidence is available to indict [B], [C] or [D], a person may be substituted for them for
the purpose of this agreement. Any substitution must have the approval of the State's Attor-
ney and must come from the organization that is being investigated ....
Id. at 12.
137. See note 19, supra. The damage that can be wrought by such "desperate villains" is
shown by the recent California allegations of wide spread concoction by jailhouse informers of
"confessions" by other inmates, arguably leading to numerous false convictions. See 3 Crim. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 181-82, 265-66, 453-54, 501-02 (1989).
138. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY DR 7-109(C) (1980). The Preliminary
Statement to the Model Code states that the Disciplinary Rules (which contain the prohibition
cited here) are "mandatory in character" and "state the minimum level of conduct below which no
lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." The Model Code has now been fol-
lowed by the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), which were intended to take the
place of the Code. Many states, however, still adhere to the Model Code. The Model Rules merely
prohibit offering "an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." Id. Rule 3.4(b). The
ABA's STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3.2(a) (1974), declare
that "[iut is unprofessional conduct to compensate a witness, other than an expert, for giving testi-
mony.... ." The AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (ATLA) (1980) Rule 3.10 provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not give a witness money or anything of substantial value, or threaten a witness
with harm, in order to induce the witness to testify . . . ." It is also likely that a defendant's
promise to a potential witness for a reward contingent on the value of his testimony to the defense
would be a criminal offense. For example, federal law makes it an offense to "corruptly ... en-
deavor[] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(1988). Courts have held that this applies to nonviolent or nonintimidating efforts to interfere with
testimony. United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1292-94 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Rubin,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
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and the error is not harmless. Thus, the State should only use contin-
gent agreements for the provision of information from an informant
who will not be a witness. Prosecutors may object that it is often diffi-
cult at the outset to foresee whether they will have to call the informer
as a witness. But whenever this possibility exists, the safer practice is to
eschew any contingency arrangement. 140
Terms in a cooperation agreement to the effect that the degree of
leniency depends on a government appraisal of the value of the cooper-
ation are just as bad as raw contingency clauses. In United States v.
Dailey 4' the government promised the cooperators, who already had
been convicted, that if they cooperated fully, the government would
recommend a sentence of twenty years or less, and that, depending on
the value of the cooperation, the government "in its sole discretion"
might recommend a term of no more than ten years. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that this agreement did not taint the testimony
of the cooperators. The court's holding is unconvincing. A sliding scale
of benefits is eminently likely to egg the cooperators on to greater ef-
forts. They know that even if they cooperate fully they still might not
win the big prize. To receive the lightest possible sentence they must do
something more, which is not precisely defined but which consists of
impressing the government very much with the value of their testi-
mony. These types of conditions dangle almost irresistible temptations
before witnesses to lie or enhance testimony and invest the government
with an unfailing capacity to apply coercion. 4 2 The lack of measurable
standards for fulfillment of the promise confers on the government a
tyrannical power to profess a continuing lack of satisfaction so that the
cooperator feels goaded to ever greater efforts to please. Courts should
140. At least in federal practice, it will be very unlikely that a cooperation agreement with an
accomplice or someone receiving immunity or leniency in return for testimony will include an ex-
press contingency in terms of the return of an indictment or a conviction. These express contin-
gencies are more likely to occur when the arrangement is with an informer rather than a
cooperator. One court has suggested that, while contingency agreements generally do not taint
testimony, there would be a due process violation if the government promised the witness a reward
for information and testimony against a specific individual against whom no reasonable suspicion
existed. See United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1374 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923
(1986). This is "pretargeting" in the strongest sense and the suggestion of a constitutional violation
is connected with the idea that certain government practices impermissibly lead to entrapment.
See id.; see also United States v. Terrill, 835 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1987).
141. 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Dailey, see infra notes 142-43 and
accompanying text.
142. For a good analysis of Dailey, concluding that such agreements should render the testi-
mony inadmissible, see Neil B. Eisenstadt, Note, Let's Make A Deal: A Look at United States v.
Dailey and Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation Agreements, 67 B.U. L. REv. 749 (1987). The danger
here is not confined to tainting testimony. The imprecise government promise is given in exchange
for the value of cooperation. This may tempt the cooperator to improprieties other than false
testimony-such as entrapment, threatening others into cooperation, or supporting false stories.
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not permit the prosecution to pressure the cooperator in this way, with
a wink and a shake of the head, but should restrict the prosecution to
obtaining simple promises to testify fully and truthfully. 143
But the prohibition of naked contingency clauses or vague stan-
dards for appraising the value of the cooperation, even though desira-
ble, ultimately will not achieve very much. Realistically, there also must
be protection for the government's interest in cooperation agreements.
If a cooperator simply promises to tell the truth and fulfills his promise
and wins immunity by testimony that exonerates the defendant, the
government naturally will have satisfied no interest. How then may the
necessary quid pro quo be assured while avoiding unacceptable doubts
as to the truth of the cooperator's testimony? The answer lies in con-
formity between the proffer and later testimony. At the outset, the gov-
ernment will make no offer unless the proffer indicates that the
cooperator's testimony will at least substantially strengthen the prose-
cution's case. It seems, therefore, that an appropriate, indeed a neces-
sary, condition to impose is that future testimony not depart
substantially from the proffer. Agreements can satisfy this condition in-
directly, and in a seemingly bland and innocuous fashion, by requiring
that the cooperator always tell the full truth, for if the testimony differs
from the proffer then the cooperator has violated the truth-telling con-
dition somewhere, and the prosecution may call off the deal.144
This formula superficially will sanitize the agreement by eschewing
any express promise to give testimony of a particular content, but the
truth-telling requirement implicitly carries with it the same fundamen-
143. These pressures remain present in some form in many federal cooperation agreements.
It is typical that a cooperator will receive specific transactional immunity for certain offenses but
will be required to plead guilty to others. With respect to his sentence on the offenses to which he
is pleading, a standard agreement in use in the Eastern District of New York (provided by the
Federal Defenders Service of the New York Legal Aid Society) contains the following provision:
If the Office determines that [the cooperator] has cooperated fully, provided substantial assis-
tance to law enforcement authorities and otherwise complied with the terms of this agree-
ment, the Office will file a motion with the sentencing court setting forth the nature and
extent of [his] cooperation. . . . In this connection it is understood that the Office's determi-
nation of whether [the cooperator] has cooperated fully and provided substantial assistance,
and the Office's assessment of the value, truthfulness, completeness and accuracy of the coop-
eration, shall be binding upon [him].
The extent of the benefit here is loosely governed by the Sentencing Guidelines, but the govern-
ment seeks to empower itself to act in an unfettered way in deciding whether the cooperator will
receive any benefit.
144. A standard form of cooperation agreement in use in the Eastern District of New York
(supplied by the Federal Defenders' Service of the New York Legal Aid Society) provides:
Should it be judged by the Office that [the cooperator] has failed to cooperate fully, or has
intentionally given false, misleading or incomplete information or testimony . . . [he] shall
thereafter be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which the Office has
knowledge, including, but not limited to, perjury and obstruction of justice.
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tal demands. In the first place, the witness will know that he has no
chance to gain immunity or leniency unless the information that he ini-
tially furnishes appears weighty enough to aid in convicting a target. At
an early stage he almost certainly will testify before a grand jury. If this
testimony differs in any significant way from the information he gave
the police and the prosecutor, he may lose immediately any expectation
of leniency or immunity, since it logically follows that either the infor-
mation tendered to the police or the grand jury testimony was false.
Similarly, if his testimony at trial differs either from the information
tendered or from his grand jury testimony, he risks losing the benefits
of the bargain and also risks prosecution for perjury. The prosecution
thus may bring the strongest pressures to bear without, in the coopera-
tion agreement, explicitly trading leniency or immunity for trial results.
The initial condition that information and projected testimony be
sufficiently weighty to aid in the conviction of a known individual, and
the continuing de facto condition, imposed obliquely by the healthy
sounding promise to tell the truth, that the testimony conforms to the
proffer combine to produce a dilemma. Even if the government receives
minimal protection for its interests, the agreement will be tantamount
to a pretargeting contingency. The intractable problem is that a witness
may lie or make mistakes at the proffer, and conditions as to truthful-
ness may serve as the strongest inducement for the witness to perpetu-
ate the lie or not to retract the mistake. The prohibition of frank
contingency agreements, therefore, may ultimately be little more than
cosmetic. It seems impossible to give the government any protection at
all without giving it so much that the government elicits the testimony
from a cooperator under the strongest pressure. We are left with a stark
choice between excluding this whole category of testimony and trusting
the adversary system to weed out perjury.
Because of the lack of developed special rules to protect the de-
fendant, juries and occasionally courts are sometimes uneasy about
heavy reliance on bargained testimony. One federal judge, in dismissing
an indictment on a variety of grounds, all having to do with governmen-
tal improprieties before the grand jury, relied in part on the govern-
ment's extensive use of informal immunity, which he described as a
"damnable practice."1 5 Such judicial condemnation is extremely rare,
but we may speculate that acquittals by juries are sometimes attributa-
ble, at least in part, either to skepticism about the credibility of cooper-
ating witnesses who, in addition to their confessed participation in the
instant crime, may also have extensive criminal records, or to revulsion
145. United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp. 223, 233 (D. Wyo. 1983), rev'd, 778 F.2d 602
(10th Cir. 1985).
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at the sources of the- prosecution's case. Some may see these jury re-
sponses as a sufficient vindication of the system's reliance on cross-ex-
amination and summation to protect the defendant's position; others
may view them as an admonition and a signal that we need to develop
further safeguards.14
V. FAIRNESS TO THE COOPERATING WITNESS
The cooperating witness is not a strong candidate for sympathy. He
is likely getting much better than he deserves-either full immunity or
a lenient outcome, unmerited in terms of the degree and nature of his
criminal activity, and purchased by his often unrepentant and selfish
willingness to assist in ensuring that others get what they deserve. But,
whatever his moral worth, his fate under and after the cooperation
agreement deserves attention because it is an important index of the
fairness and integrity of the prosecutorial system. A bargain is, after all,
a bargain. Double dealing by the State will create doubts about the rec-
titude of the criminal justice process. 47
146. As a postscript, it may be interesting to note recent British experience with a heavy
reliance on cooperating witnesses. As with our federal system, Anglo-Welsh law does not require
corroboration for accomplice testimony though cautionary instructions are required. The system-
atic use of cooperating informers in trials of violent or dangerous professional criminals apparently
became prominent in London in the 1970s, TONY GIFFORD, SUPERGRASSES: THE USE OF ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 6 (1984), giving rise to the British underworld term "supergrass"
to denote an informer on a large scale. ("Grass" is a British underworld and law-enforcement term
for an informer.) Sixteen convictions resulted from the evidence of Bertie Smalls who had received
immunity and who was described in the Court of Appeal as "one of the most dangerous and craven
villains who ha[s] ever given evidence for the Crown." R. v. Turner, 61 Crim. App. 67, 79 (C.A.
1975), quoted in GIFFORD, supra, at 7. Other prominent offenders were given short sentences and
favorable treatment while in detention in return for their collaboration. GIFFORD, supra, at 6-7.
But there was a high rate of acquittals in cases in which supergrasses testified, and the Director of
Public Prosecutions later issued instructions that in the future no cases should be brought on
uncorroborated supergrass evidence. Id. at 7-8.
In the early 1980s supergrass testimony became a frequent and initially very successful mode
of prosecuting terrorists in nonjury trials in Northern Ireland. See Greer, The Supergrass: A Coda,
FORTNIGHT, March 1984, at 7. Supergrasses were immunized and promised new lives in any English
speaking country. In the first such prosecution, 38 people were charged and 35 convicted after an
eight-month trial. A succession of these trials led to criticism that the supergrasses (or "converted
terrorists" as the authorities preferred to style them) were being coached by police and, indeed,
often simply were subscribing to statements written for them by the police. As the testimony given
by some supergrasses became evidently and even ludicrously inaccurate, and as several of them
recanted their initial testimony, acquittals and reversals on appeal ensued. The supergrass move-
ment, therefore, waned and seemingly died out after a few years. See GIFFORD, supra, at 8.
147. In United States v. Pavia, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969), the government made what
may have been its last attempt in a federal case to argue that it was not bound by an agreement
not to prosecute even if the defendant had carried out his side of the bargain. It relied in part on
The Whiskey Cases, supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text, to contend that the defendant's
best remedy was to apply for executive clemency. It also argued that the doctrine of separation of
powers should bar a court from interfering with prosecutorial discretion to pursue the case. The
district court decisively rejected both arguments. Courts now generally recognize the importance of
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The doctrines of the criminal process provide little help, however,
in deciding whether bargains have been kept or whether a bargain was
from the start unconscionable. Traditionally, courts look to the law of
contracts to answer these questions. A prime task for the courts in this
area is to adapt principles of contract in the light of the relevant issues
of public policy and constitutional protection. 148
Clearly a suspect or defendant who enters into a cooperation agree-
ment without an attorney's assistance in drafting the agreement will be
at considerable risk. First, there is the question of what degree of use
immunity extends to communications made during the first contacts
between the government and the potential cooperator. This stage is a
delicate dance in which the witness must seek to persuade the govern-
ment that what he has to offer is worth immunity or leniency while, at
the same time, not irretrievably incriminating himself. These early ne-
gotiations may occur through use of a formal proffer or they may take
place in a series of informal meetings between the witness and govern-
ment agents or prosecutors.
The cooperator's attorney at an early stage may make an offer
couched in hypothetical terms. If the potential cooperator is not pre-
sent at the proffer, no problem of incrimination will arise.1 49 The prose-
cutor early on, however, likely will insist on an interview with the
cooperator. Here questions arise as to the degree of immunity that will
apply.150
holding the government to immunity agreements. See United States v. Palumbo, 897 F.2d 245, 246
(7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[t]he system works . . . only if each side keeps its end of the
bargain").
148. As the Supreme Court stated:
A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere exec-
utory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an ac-
cused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea
that implicates the Constitution.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984) (footnote omitted). Since immunity agreements do
not result in any court judgment, it would be even more difficult to view them as directly implicat-
ing constitutional guarantees.
149. In United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319, 1326-27 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047
(1974), the Third Circuit held that an attorney's nonverbal answers to an investigator's questions
in the presence of the defendant were admissible as an admission.
150. Rule 11(e)(6)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "any state-
ment made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government which do not
result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn" shall not be admissible
against the defendant in any civil or criminal proceeding. While this Rule does not expressly refer
to immunity discussions, courts appear to treat it as applicable. See, e.g., United States v. Boltz,
663 F. Supp. 956 (D. Alaska 1987). But this provision confers bare use immunity without deriva-
tive use protection and so is limited in its value. See United States v. Cusack, 827 F.2d 696 (11th
Cir. 1987). Counsel for a cooperating witness should try to insist on use and derivative use immu-
nity for the witness's first proffer. Such immunity was promised in United States v. Palumbo, 897
F.2d 245, 247 (7th Cir. 1990), where the parties ultimately failed to work out a cooperation agree-
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Controversial questions also may arise early in negotiations about
the ultimate scope of immunity or the concessions to be afforded on a
plea.151 Does informal immunity travel across jurisdictional frontiers, ei-
ther between the federal government and a state or between federal dis-
tricts? These issues may be crucial to the cooperator, and counsel's aid
is thus virtually indispensable. 152 From the defendant's point of view it
ment. Palumbo's conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the govern-
ment had not passed the Kastigar test, see infra note 166, of showing that their evidence was
untainted. The federal prosecutor most likely will be unwilling, however, to accede to a full use
and derivative use term in the agreement out of fear that the proffer may contain little of value
and the witness may use it to take an "immunity bath." A standard form of proffer agreement
used in the Eastern District of New York (provided by the Federal Defender's Office of the New
York Legal Aid Society) provides that the government will give bare use immunity for the proffer
and expressly states that "the Office may use information derived directly or indirectly from the
meeting for the purpose of obtaining leads to other evidence, which evidence may be used in any
prosecution and sentencing of [the one who makes the proffer] by the Office." The agreement form
further requires the potential cooperator to waive any claim that his statements at the interview
"are inadmissible for cross-examination should [he] testify." These provisions make proffers a
risky business. If the information tendered is not what the government wants or is not consistent
with the government's theory, the potential cooperator is likely to be prosecuted in the most disad-
vantageous circumstances.
151. See infra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
152. With respect to the hazard of prosecution by a different sovereign, informal immunity
gives less protection than a formal immunity grant. Federally granted formal immunity binds the
states while the federal government and other states must recognize state-granted formal immu-
nity under the Fifth Amendment and the due process clause. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964). Since informal immunity has a primarily equitable foundation, it is not consti-
tutionally binding in other jurisdictions. The federal government, thus, is not bound by informal
immunity extended by a state officer unless the state officer was acting as a federal agent. See
United States v. Long, 511 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975). As between
federal districts, the approach laid down in United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986),
is that "the agreements reached are those of the Government" and "[ilt is the Government at
large-not just specific United States Attorneys or United States 'Districts'-that is bound by plea
agreements. . . ." Id. at 303. In United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) (en banc),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974), the United States Attorney in one district promised a cooperat-
ing defendant that he would not be prosecuted on charges pending in another district. The court
held that the United States Attorney in the second district was bound by the promise. Id. at 428.
And in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe prosecu-
tor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by
one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government." Id. at 154. The court in
United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986), however, made it clear that this approach is
dispositive only when the agreement is ambiguous. The government may validly contract to limit
the immunity or plea bargain to a particular district. In United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976), the court held that a promise not to prosecute for certain
offenses made as part of a plea bargain by a federal strike force prosecutor in the Eastern District
of New York did not bind the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. The
Department of Justice in its Principles of Federal Prosecution, supra note 48, Part F(3)(b), now
directs government attorneys, if practicable, to restrict an agreement to nonprosecution to the
particular district. A provision in a standard cooperation agreement used in the Eastern District of
New York (provided by the Federal Defender Service of the New York Legal Aid Society) reads:
"This agreement is limited to the United States' Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New
York ... and cannot bind other federal, state or local prosecuting authorities." If a state inter-
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is important for the agreement to provide that the court, and not the
government, determine questions as to breach,15 3 and that only a mate-
rial and substantial breach shall be a ground for rescission.
Even though the cooperator clearly may be prosecuted if he
breaches the agreement, another important issue is whether the govern-
ment can use the cooperator's statements after the breach. The federal
statutory protection of statements made during plea or immunity nego-
tiations15' does not apply to statements made after an agreement is
reached if there is a subsequent breach.155 The application of this prin-
ciple generally will render the cooperator's position hopeless if a breach
is established. Counsel can attempt to secure a term in the agreement
that rejects or limits the use or derivative use of defendant's statements
if the government should assert a breach.156 Assistance of counsel,
therefore, is invaluable to a defendant-potential cooperator at these
early stages. The presence of counsel during interviews is also impor-
tant so that she may advise the cooperator on the dangers of offering a
prets a state immunity agreement as not extending to another county or district in the state, a
federal court in a habeas proceeding will not give relief if the restriction of the immunity was
lawful under state law. See Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1989). Courts sometimes ap-
proach this issue under agency principles and do not perceive it as having constitutional signifi-
cance. Id.
153. The government typically will seek to insert a term that it shall be the sole judge of
whether the agreement is breached. The standard form of cooperation agreement used in the East-
ern District of New York (supplied by the Federal Defender's Service of the New York Legal Aid
Society) provides that penalties for breach shall be imposed "[slhould it be judged by the Office
that [the cooperator] has failed to cooperate fully, or has intentionally given false, misleading or
incomplete information or testimony ... or has otherwise violated any provision of this agree-
ment." Similarly, under the standard agreement form, the United States Attorney's Office shall
decide whether there has been full cooperation. The form provides: "[lit is understood that the
Office's determination of whether [the cooperator] has cooperated fully and provided substantial
assistance, and the Office's assessment of the value, truthfulness, completeness and accuracy of the
cooperation, shall be binding upon [the cooperator]." Taken literally, this agreement is surely un-
conscionable and a court would not uphold perverse judgments on these matters.
154. See FEn, R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6), discussed supra note 150.
155. See United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967
(1980); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). In Hutto
v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's confession made prior to
withdrawing from a plea bargain was not per se inadmissible as involuntary and was not covered
by Rule 11(e)(6). Id. at 30 n.3.
156. The point is that even if the breaching cooperator cannot get immunity from prosecu-
tion, he still might get immunity from the use or derivative use of any statements he made pursu-
ant to the agreement. A careless promise also can prejudice the government's interests. In United
States v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1990), for example, the government orally agreed that it
would use the defendant's grand jury testimony only in a perjury prosecution. The defendant
breached by not testifying truthfully before the grand jury, and the government sought to use
defendant's grand jury testimony in its prosecution of him. The court held that the government
was bound by its oral promise and could not use the grand jury testimony against the defendant in
a prosecution for a nonperjury offense. Id. at 302.
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different version in later testimony. .57
Agreement negotiations also afford the cooperating witness an op-
portunity to create sentencing benefits. Federally, in plea cases, the wit-
ness can seek to include acknowledgements in the agreement such as a
recognition that the cooperator has accepted responsibility," 8 or that he
played a minimal or minor role in the criminal activity. 59 Acknowledge-
ments of this type may constitute grounds for favorable sentence ad-
justments under the Sentencing Guidelines. Even more important, a
court may reduce a sentence below the Guidelines' lower limit if the
government makes a motion stating that "the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense.' 160 The court has discretion to
determine the appropriate reduction in these cases, and the Guidelines
provide that, in so doing, the court should give "substantial weight" to
the government's evaluation. 161 The cooperator, therefore, will want a
government promise to make a favorable sentencing motion included in
the cooperation agreement. This promise also strengthens the prosecu-
tor's hand since her assessment of the truthfulness and impact of the
cooperator's testimony will determine both whether the government
makes the sentencing reduction motion at all and how favorable that
motion will be. Finally, the cooperator also will seek a promise that, if
cooperation continues after sentence, the government will move within
one year under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for
a further reduction of sentence. 62 This possibility keeps pressure on
157. Obviously counsel should not advise the witness to lie in order to preserve conformity,
but interviews may be extensive and the witness, through faulty memory or confusion, might cre-
ate discrepancies. Counsel can make notes during interviews and go over them with the witness
prior to his testimony.
158. Section 3E.l(a) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, reprinted in 18 U.S.C.S. app.
(Law. Co-op. 1990), provides that the offense level for sentencing purposes should be reduced by
two levels "[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of
personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." A defendant does not have a right to this reduc-
tion, however, merely because he pleads guilty. Id. § 3E1.1(c). The government can help the de-
fendant get his sentence reduced by telling the court that he has made full and truthful
admissions.
159. Section 3B1.2(a) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides that the sentencing level
shall be decreased by four levels if the defendant was a "minimal participant in any criminal
activity." Section 3B1.2(b) provides for a two level decrease if he was a "minor participant." Under
the Sentencing Guidelines, the plea agreement may be accompanied by a stipulation of facts rele-
vant to sentencing. See U.S. SENT. GUIDE. § 6B1.4(a). The stipulation must not contain misleading
facts. See id. § 6B1.4(a)(2). Nevertheless, this provision gives the government some leeway to agree
to a statement of facts that presents the defendant's participation in criminal activity in the best
light possible.
160. U.S. SENT. GUIDE. § 5K1.1.
161. See id. application n.3.
162. The current version of Rule 35(b), FED. R. CRIM. P., provides that within a year after
sentencing the court may, on motion of the government, lower a sentence:
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the cooperator even after sentence has been imposed.
Complex questions with a vital bearing on the witness's fate often
arise in interpreting immunity deals and plea bargains for cooperation.
Consider the story of Drax Quatermain who, for some time, had been
manufacturing amphetamines with a partner, Zelman Fairorth. 1's
Quatermain testified against Fairorth in return for a promise of immu-
nity. Quatermain's testimony covered, as the agreement recited, his
"participation and involvement with Zelman A. Fairorth and others re-
lating to the manufacture of methamphetamine.' ' 6 4 Fairorth was duly
convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, but while on bail
pending appeal, in a turn of the tables, he became an informant for the
United States Attorney in an investigation of Quatermain relating to
suspicions that Quatermain had diversified into manufacturing silencers
for guns. With money supplied by the government, Fairorth bought
materials for making silencers and delivered them to Quatermain.
Quatermain was indicted for a firearms offense,1 5 and moved to
dismiss on the ground that the government obtained the evidence sup-
to reflect a defendant's subsequent, substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense, in accordance with the guidelines and policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of Title 28, United
States Code. The court's authority to lower a sentence under this subdivision includes the
authority to lower such a sentence to a level below that established by statute as a minimum
sentence.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988). A court may not take favorable notice of
cooperation in the absence of a government motion, see United States v. Reina, 905 F.2d 638, 640
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1990), unless the government's
refusal to file the motion is shown to be arbitrary and capricious, see Reina, 905 U.S. at 641;
United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1017-18 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Smitherman,
889 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1493 (1990). But see United States v.
Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the sentencing judge was free to consider infor-
mation regarding the defendant's cooperation despite the absence of a government motion).
163. United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).
164. Id. at 44 n.1. The full text of the pertinent part of the letter of agreement ran as follows:
This letter is to confirm our understanding with respect to your cooperation with the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the United States Attorney's Office in its investigation of
Zelman A. Fairorth and others who are allegedly involved in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. It has been agreed that in return for your cooperation and truthful testi-
mony in any court proceeding related to these matters that the Government will provide you
with immunity from prosecution for your participation and involvement with Zelman A.
Fairorth and others relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine. It is further agreed
that at the completion of our investigation the Government will provide you with a letter
setting forth the extent of your cooperation and the results of that cooperation in terms of
seizure of contraband and prosecution of suspected violators. Finally, it is understood that
application has been made on your behalf to include you and your family under the Depart-
ment of Justice witness protection plan. In the event that you are not accepted into the wit-
ness protection plan the Drug Enforcement Administration has agreed to provide you with
the same services and protections afforded by the Department of Justice witness plan.
165. The government thus got two for the price of none.
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porting the indictment in breach of Quatermain's immunity bargain.
This ambitious and ingenious argument contended that, since Fairorth
had a revenge motive that the government exploited, Fairorth's testi-
mony to the grand jury was derived from Quatermain's earlier testi-
mony against Fairorth. Treating the motion as one to suppress
Fairorth's testimony, the district court, persuaded by Quatermain's ar-
gument, issued a suppression order. The government appealed.
Both sides agreed that the resolution of the appeal should depend
on what kind of immunity the government had granted Quatermain.
Quatermain argued that it must have been at least use and fruits im-
munity, the degree that is required constitutionally under a formal
grant to compel testimony.16 6 He thus posited that since Fairorth's tes-
timony was a fruit of his own earlier testimony, it was properly sup-
pressed. The government responded that a proper and natural reading
of the agreement6 7 suggested a limited transactional immunity only for
offenses relating to amphetamines. 66 Avoiding a resolution of this ques-
tion, the majority of the appellate court panel reversed on the ground
that even derivative use immunity cannot extend to future crimes. 6 9
The dissent, calling the case an "odd mix of civil contract and estoppel
law thrust into the context of a criminal prosecution," 70 read the con-
tract as providing a broader immunity with respect to Quatermain's in-
volvement with Fairorth, especially in the light of other evidence
indicating that the government, in contemplating future use of
Quatermain as an informer, suspected that Quatermain might engage in
166. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
167. The agreement used the term "immunity from prosecution for." See supra note 164.
168. The government argued that use and fruits immunity was not constitutionally required
since Quatermain's testimony was voluntary. 613 F.2d at 40. This argument goes to the heart of
the difference between formal and informal immunity. The case is also a good example of how use
and fruits immunity can confer protection that is in one sense more extensive and in another
narrower than transactional immunity. The use and fruits immunity was more extensive in that it
barred use or derivative use of the testimony in any criminal prosecution, at least for crimes al-
ready committed, even if unrelated to amphetamines. On the other hand, use and fruits was nar-
rower than transactional immunity since, even for the amphetamine crimes, prosecution remained
a possibility if the government derived no independent evidence from Quatermain's testimony.
Transactional immunity, by contrast, "accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to
which the compelled testimony relates." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
169. 613 F.2d at 40-42. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), the Court held that
the Fifth Amendment privilege may extend to future acts when there is a substantial hazard of
incrimination. The Court's holding in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), however, appar-
ently narrowed Marchetti. The Quatermain court read Marchetti as confined to cases where the
future conduct involved "was part of a continuing course of similar criminal activity." 613 F.2d at
42. In Harvey v. United States, 869 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir. 1989), the court held that informal trans-
actional immunity for certain narcotics offenses did not extend to future tax offenses related to
money derived from the immunized drug offenses.
170. 613 F.2d at 44 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 45:1
AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
future illegal acts. 17 1
In light of these facts, one could simply be thankful that it is in
criminals' nature to cut each other's throats and that prosecutors are
clever enough to turn them against each other. But the case also reveals
causes for concern: (1) Quatermain was uncounselled when he entered
into his immunity agreement; (2) the government perhaps to some ex-
tent contemplated his participating in future criminal conspiracies; and
(3) the agreement's loose phrasing led naturally to adversarial positions
on its extent and import. Certainly, this case underlines the disadvan-
tage to witnesses or defendants who enter cooperation agreements with-
out the aid of counsel.
There is also a hanging question mark about what reward, apart
from the sweet taste of vengeance, Fairorth received for turning in
Quatermain. Fairorth's conviction was still on appeal and the govern-
ment, therefore, still could join in a motion for the reduction of his sen-
tence based on his cooperation in the prosecution of Quatermain. 172 If
this was the deal with Fairorth, then the government bought Fairorth's
conviction with Quatermain's immunity, and subsequently, in a neat
turnabout, bought Quatermain's conviction with Fairorth's sentence re-
duction. Practices like these, if left unregulated, can place the State in
the suspect role of licensing and managing some crime and some
criminals in order to hit the target of the day. Perhaps this is the only
successful method of convicting for some categories of offenses and of-
fenders, but there should be some attempt to introduce safeguards that
could sanitize these strategies without seriously impeding them.
These concerns are highlighted and amplified by the fairly common
cooperation agreement in United States v. Brown..73 In Brown the gov-
ernment granted the defendant immunity for a narcotics offense in re-
turn for promises, incorporated in a letter agreement, that included the
customary obligation to give "full cooperation.". 7' In addition to giving
information and testimony, "full cooperation" was defined to include
"participation in ongoing investigations." 7 5 A further term stipulated
that the government would not be bound by the agreement if the de-
fendant committed any "future crimes punishable by a term of impris-
onment exceeding one year. "176 The government later alleged that
171. Id. at 46 (asserting that "there was evidence that Quatermain was given some kind of
license to participate in future illegal activities").
172. The defendant at that time could make a motion for reduction of sentence under FED.
R CrM. P. 35(b).
173. 801 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1986).
174. Id. at 353.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Brown had breached the agreement by committing subsequent narcot-
ics offenses and, while conceding that he had given full cooperation,
proceeded to indict Brown for the original offense.'" A divided panel of
the court of appeals held that the indictment was valid if the govern-
ment could prove at a hearing that Brown had committed the subse-
quent offenses.
While the position that criminals must honor their bargains if they
are to get leniency or immunity is generally impeccable, there are
troubling aspects about its application in this case. The government re-
ceived full performance of the agreement's main element of considera-
tion for immunity-the cooperation of the defendant. The defendant
was in a typically subservient negotiating position with the government.
As a result, the agreement contained two elements that called for scru-
tiny. First, a natural reading of the agreement 178 bound the defendant
to cooperation for an indefinite period that might run into years. 79 Sec-
ond, in spite of his full cooperation, the commission of a later crime not
only exposed the defendant to prosecution for that offense but also
waived the immunity for his former offense. Cooperation should not
give an offender a license to commit future crimes with impunity, but
there is an appearance of overreaching when the government encour-
ages "full cooperation," gets what it wants, and in the end, gives noth-
ing in return. These considerations led the dissenting judge in Brown to
conclude that the letter agreement was an unconscionable bargain and
therefore void as against public policy.' °0
Brown also raises questions about the extent to which use and de-
rivative use immunity are affected by the defendant's breach of the
agreement. In Brown the court held that, while the defendant might be
prosecuted for the original offense that was the subject of the agree-
ment, the government could not use any statements he made while the
177. Id. at 353-54. One should not view this kind of government action as purely vindictive.
The witness has broken his agreement and the breach is not unrelated to the principal purpose of
cooperation, since the defense can use the witness's crime to impeach him and thus undermine his
testimony.
178. Generally speaking, a cooperation-immunity agreement is "contractual in nature and
subject to contract law standards." United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam). The agreement's language thus should be "read as a whole and given a reasonable inter-
pretation." Id.
179. As the dissent suggested, "the government used its superior bargaining position to al-
most blackmail Brown into signing a contract committing him to being an informant for life." 801
F.2d at 355 (Hanson, J., dissenting). It is worth noting that in this case, as in many similar situa-
tions, the government initiated and possibly set the stage for the deal. When a government under-
cover agent's investigation ended, the United States Attorney "invited Brown and his attorney to
review the government's evidence against Brown." Id. at 353.
180. Id. at 355.
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agreement was in operation. 181 The basis for the court's holding was
that the agreement contained a promise that the government would not
use the defendant's statements against him except on a prosecution for
perjury. As a practical matter, however, this type of promise is tough to
keep. Prosecutors cannot easily wash from their minds the massively
inculpatory taint of the information obtained from debriefings and from
testimony. Thus, at least in cross-examination and in anticipating de-
fenses, the government, intentionally or not, may prosecute defendants
with the aid of information derived from the statements it promised not
to use. 8' The use immunity contained in the agreement thus appears of
very little value when the government takes the position that the wit-
ness has breached the agreement.
Also of potential concern to cooperators are federal cases holding
that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) confers use immunity
for statements made during plea negotiation but does not apply to
statements made after the agreement is reached. 183 One could read
these cases as suggesting that, if an agreement collapses, use immunity
attaches only up to the conclusion of the agreement. In these cases,
however, the cooperator voluntarily withdrew from the agreement and
finally elected to go to trial. 84 The courts decided that Rule 11 immu-
nity did not apply in light of the cooperator's withdrawal. 185 This is
understandable because of the danger that a defendant could enter a
cooperation agreement in bad faith, take an "immunity bath," and then
change his mind and go to trial. As in Brown, however, often the coop-
erator is not expressly repudiating the arrangement, but rather seeks to
cling to it, and the government, upon alleged breach, asserts that immu-
nity does not apply to statements made while the agreement was in
operation. To accept the government's position in that situation seems
to work hardship where the cooperator already has supplied decisive
information or testimony.
The government typically seeks to make clear in the agreement
that a breach by the defendant will forfeit any use immunity as to
statements otherwise protected."8 8 The government thus uses its supe-
181. Id.
182. Cooperating witnesses should try to avoid this hazard by clearly stipulating in the agree-
ment that the government, upon breach, may not use any of the defendant's statements made
pursuant to the agreement.
183. United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967 (1980);
United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). These decisions
are concerned only with the applicability of Rule 11(e)(6). The policy of the Rule is to encourage
negotiations by removing a chilling threat.
184. Stirling, 571 F.2d at 730; Davis, 617 F.2d at 681.
185. Stirling, 571 F.2d at 731-32; Davis, 617 F.2d at 686.
186. The standard form of agreement used by the United States Attorney's Office for the
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rior bargaining position to ensure that the cooperator receives no bene-
fit upon breach even if he already has secured the government's major
goal of convicting other defendants. Courts should not focus, therefore,
on whether Rule 11 applies, but rather should ask whether, on all the
facts of the case, the application of concepts of breach and performance
equitably can lead to the loss of use immunity.
What further safeguards might alleviate potential unfairness to the
cooperator? The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
constitutionally unless the defendant has been formally charged. 1 7
Even if not required constitutionally, however, it would be good prac-
tice for prosecutors not to enter into cooperation agreements with sus-
pects or defendants who are without counsel. Cooperating witnesses in
fact often are counselled before letter agreements are signed. The gov-
ernment knows that the immediate advantage to the witness of cooper-
ating is so great that counsel scarcely will obstruct the deal and often
counsel may explain the deal's advantages to her client and so expedite
matters.188
Furnishing counsel for indigents presents some difficulty in infor-
mal immunity negotiations since counsel only can be appointed by the
court and there is no occasion to come before the court if no charge is
filed. Federally, this problem can be cured in most cases as an incident
to the grand jury proceedings.189 The witness almost certainly will have
to appear before the grand jury and the court will appoint counsel to
advise the witness if his appearance is connected with an immunity
agreement. Courts will assign counsel from a list that, in most districts,
includes several recent Assistant United States Attorneys familiar with
Eastern District of New York, stipulates that:
Any prosecution resulting from a breach of this agreement may be premised upon: (a) any
statements made by [the cooperator] to the Office or to other law enforcement agents; (b) any
testimony given by [him] before any grand jury or other tribunal, whether before or after the
date this agreement is signed . . .; and (c) any leads derived from such statements or
testimony.
187. See Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); United States v. Gouveia, 467
U.S. 180, 187 (1984). Cooperation negotiations may start or continue after a formal charge. A de-
fendant's counsel must be present at those negotiations unless there has been a waiver.
188. When cooperation is clearly in the witness's best interest, defense counsel can assist
both sides greatly. Counsel can gauge the government's needs and willingness to offer leniency or
immunity and make clear to the witness the type and extent of cooperation necessary to make the
deal. The government, therefore, usually will be anxious to secure counsel for the witness once it is
clear that he is going to cooperate. The government may wish, however, to interview the witness
and secure incriminating statements before he obtains counsel.
189. If the potential cooperator is a target, the federal practice is that he will not be subpoe-
naed to appear before the grand jury. The formal need for appointment of counsel, however, easily
can be created by serving a subpoena for exemplars (handwriting, fingerprints, and similar evi-




cooperation procedures. Federally, therefore, this process generally goes
smoothly. Cooperation agreements nevertheless are reached in a signifi-
cant number of cases without counsel representing the witness. In the
absence of counsel, however, an agreement may not be reduced to writ-
ing, creating a situation obviously fraught with danger for the witness
and for the defendant against whom his cooperation is directed.
While ensuring that cooperators have counsel during agreement ne-
gotiations is a step in the right direction, in light of the intense pressure
on potential witnesses and the larger questions of public policy in-
volved, we need to consider further possibilities of ventilating and scru-
tinizing cooperation agreements. As discussed earlier, 90 one possibility
is requiring that a judge validate all cooperation agreements. The inde-
pendent commission, proposed earlier, 9 ' similarly could help remedy
the lack of vigilance in this area.
Additionally, courts could improve their role in reviewing the im-
plementation of cooperation agreements. Courts should hold, of course,
the government 9 2 and the defendant' to the bargain. Courts generally
have no great difficulty in deciding what the government promised and
whether it has discharged its promises, at least when the agreement is
reduced to writing.19 4 Whether the cooperator has performed under the
agreement, however, is often more contestable. The cooperator's obliga-
tions-typically to cooperate and testify fully-are inherently vague.
Prosecutors, having promised immunity or leniency before seeing the
results, are naturally at times disappointed in the outcome and seek to
avoid their contingent promise. 195
190. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
192. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 184,
187 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that "[t]he
Government must adhere strictly to the terms of the bargains it strikes with defendants"), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973). See
generally Peter Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bar-
gains, 66 CAL. L. REV. 471 (1978).
193. See United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir.) (stating that "[a] de-
fendant's failure to fulfill the terms of a pretrial agreement relieves the government of its recipro-
cal obligations under the agreement"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); see also United States v.
Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Resnick, 483 F.2d 354, 358 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973); United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973).
194. The government's promise is usually either not to prosecute at all or to prosecute only
on specific charges. There may be supplementary promises, such as a promise to make a favorable
sentencing statement, or to enroll the cooperator in the witness protection program. There may be
an ambiguity, however, about the nature and scope of the immunity promised by the government.
See, e.g., United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1980), discussed supra notes 163-71
and accompanying text.
195. If the prosecutor thus chooses to go forward against the cooperating defendant, the de-
fendant may move to dismiss the indictment. This is the proper procedure for the defendant to
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In determining enforceability of a cooperation agreement, princi-
ples of contract law govern. 1 6 Courts accordingly have taken the posi-
tion that before the defendant will lose the benefit of the bargain the
government must show that he was guilty of a substantial breach.19 7
Not surprisingly, outcomes under this standard may be controversial.
An immunity or plea agreement may require the cooperator to do many
things.19 There may be reasonable disagreement as to whether neglect
to fulfill one or more of the items constitutes a substantial breach. A
court sometimes may find that a defendant's breach was
inconsequential. e9
An example is United States v. Wood.200 In Wood the defendant
had negotiated an immunity agreement under which he promised to
"fully and truthfully disclose to law enforcement everything that he
knows concerning offers to, or the actual bribery of any public official
concerning any matter ... including drug importation and drug distri-
raise the claim that his prosecution is precluded by a prior agreement. See United States v.
Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 1984). If the dispute then turns on whether the defendant
has complied with the agreement, a hearing usually will be necessary. United States v. Calabrese,
645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); see also United States v. Ver-
rusio, 803 F.2d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1986). These hearings are sometimes referred to as "pre-depriva-
tion" hearings since they determine whether the cooperator is to be deprived of his benefits under
the agreement. The government has the burden of establishing a breach by the defendant.
Calabrese, 645 F.2d at 1390 (stating that "[tihe question of a defendant's breach is not an issue to
be finally determined unilaterally by the government," and that "the government has the burden
of establishing a breach by the defendant if the agreement is to be considered unenforceable"). A
breach must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Verrusio, 803 F.2d at 890-91. One
scholar who has examined the possible standards of proof for breach of cooperation agreements
concluded that proof by a preponderance is both the majority view and the most suitable one.
Julie A. Lumpkin, Note, The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a Defendant Has
Materially Breached a Plea Agreement, 55 FORDHAm L. REV. 1059, 1084-86 (1987). If terms in a
plea agreement are ambiguous, courts should construe them in favor of the defendant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Coleman, 895 F.2d
501, 505 (8th Cir. 1990). Undue delay by the government in acting on the breach may be construed
as a waiver if the government continues to accept the benefits of the agreement. United States v.
Vogt, 901 F.2d 100, 102 (8th Cir. 1990).
196. See United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 179 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that "[p]lea
bargains are subject to contract law principles insofar as their application will insure the defendant
what is reasonably due him"); cf. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) (stat-
ing that application of private contract law "may require . . . tempering in particular cases").
197. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 929, 930-32 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
824 (1986); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Paiva,
294 F. Supp. 742, 748 (D.D.C. 1969).
198. For example in United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165, 167-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Nathan 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973), the
agreement required Boulier to furnish numerous very specific pieces of information, including par-
ticular methods of smuggling, the addresses and location of certain individuals, and the location of
drug processing laboratories. It also required him to introduce an undercover agent to two narcot-
ics dealers. Id. at 168.
199. See United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).
200. 780 F.2d 929 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986).
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bution conspiracies now under investigation. ' 20 .1 Over eight months
Wood had several interviews with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and made extensive disclosures. The government nevertheless alleged
breach of the agreement on the following grounds: (1) Wood had ini-
tially denied selling cocaine to a certain individual and had only admit-
ted to the sale when confronted with evidence; (2) Wood had lied about
one act of bribery; (3) Wood later was arrested for arranging a drug deal
on which he had given no information to the government. Wood argued
that he had substantially performed and ultimately had cured some of
his omissions by telling the truth. The district court found that Wood's
new drug deal did not constitute a breach since it was not a matter
"under investigation" at the time of the agreement and the government
had never asked Wood questions specifically relating to this incident.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that failure to disclose the
new drug deal was a substantial breach since a proper reading of the
agreement required Wood to disclose all that he knew about any drug
offenses.202
In Wood the defendant had provided very useful information and
testimony which may have led to the successful convictions of other of-
fenders. Yet, failure to "come clean" with every piece of information
relevant to a general segment of criminal offenses deprived the defend-
ant of any benefit from the bargain. This all-or-nothing outcome
amounts to a harsh application of formal contractual principles to coop-
eration agreements. 20 3 In these agreements, the cooperator promises
services that may be spread out over a period of time. He also may
promise to abstain from certain conduct. If he actually performs a sub-
stantial segment of his promised acts of service, he should not lose the
entire benefit of the bargain. Again, the cooperator usually trades away
his Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination. Once he has fur-
nished information or given testimony, the constitutional deprivation is
complete. The government retains substantial benefits from the exe-
cuted portions of the contract. 20 4 For the government then to withdraw
201. Id. at 930.
202. Id. at 931-32.
203. An example of a less harsh and perhaps more rational result is found in United States v.
Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1984). In Brimberry the defendant, a participant in a complex
fraud scheme, entered a cooperation agreement that allowed him to plead guilty to one tax felony.
In exchange the defendant gave the government extensive information on the fraud scheme and
led the government to records that might otherwise have been destroyed. He also testified before
the Securities and Exchange Commission and before a grand jury, leading to the indictment of
several persons. Two of those indicted told the government that Brimberry had instructed them to
destroy records. The government viewed this as a breach of the plea agreement and indicted
Brimberry for obstruction of justice. As to the original charges involving the fraud scheme, how-
ever, the defendant apparently was allowed to stand on his plea to one felony tax count.
204. Cooperation agreements do not fit easily into contract law concepts, which, for the most
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all of the promised immunity or leniency is a momentous act that
courts should permit only when the defendant's breach destroys the
government's capacity to make any substantial use of the information
or testimony. 05
Courts should expand the equitable contracts doctrine of part per-
formance to include these cooperation agreements. The doctrine of part
performance entitles a party who fell short of full execution of the
terms of a contract to some compensation for his efforts under the
agreement.0 6 Courts have not yet applied this sophisticated doctrine to
cooperation agreements, perhaps in part because the Supreme Court, in
the seminal case of Santobello v. New York, listed specific performance
and rescission as the only remedies available to a defendant who shows
that the prosecutor breached the terms of a plea bargain.2 07 This ap-
proach may be entirely correct when the breach is committed by the
government, for the defendant's constitutional rights are implicated
and the only sufficient vindication would be to give the defendant what
was promised or allow the defendant the alternative of reverting to
prebargain status. If we apply Santobello to breaches by the defendant,
however, rescission becomes the government's sole remedy. Specific per-
formance will not be an available remedy, either because it is no longer
factually possible for the defendant to perform the bargain or because it
would involve unconstitutionally compelling the defendant to incrimi-
nate himself.20 s
part, have evolved with respect to commercial relationships in which a transfer of goods or services
in return for money predominates and damages are the typical remedy. Several sections of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts are, however, relevant. Section 241(a) provides that, in deter-
mining whether a failure to perform is material, one relevant circumstance is "the extent to which
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected." Another relevant
circumstance is "the extent to which the party failing to perform ... will suffer forfeiture." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(c) (1979). The Comment to § 241 states:
[A] failure is less likely to be regarded as material if it occurs late, after substantial prepara-
tion or performance .... For the same reason the failure is more likely to be regarded as
material if such preparation or performance as has taken place can be returned to and sal-
vaged by the party failing to perform ....
Id. § 241 cmt. d.
205. This is not to say that the breach is immaterial. If a cooperator lies to the government,
the defense could use the lie to impeach his testimony and so could diminish his usefulness to the
prosecution. The government no doubt wants to send a message to future cooperators that all
terms in cooperation agreements are important and any breach will be regarded as serious.
206. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts confines part performance to contracts in
which the obligations to be exchanged "can be apportioned into corresponding pairs of part per-
formances so that the parts of each pair are properly regarded as agreed equivalents"; that is, to
contracts that are divisible. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240. An illustration in the
comment to § 240 indicates that substantial performance of personal services is a category to
which courts should apply the doctrine of part performance. Id. § 240 cmt. d, illus. 4.
207. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971).
208. See Note supra note 195, at 1068-69. The Court's recognition in Santobello that specific
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Thus, this parallelism does not make good sense. Because of the
usual complexity of the defendant's promises2 °0 and because the gov-
ernment may gain great value out of part performance, courts should
invoke a flexible view of equitable remedies. Courts could limit the
charges, reduce the sentence, or otherwise consider the defendant's part
performance of his agreement. Courts can make these considerations in-
formally in most jurisdictions, but we should formally recognize an obli-
gation of courts to consider part performance of cooperation
agreements. 10 Some charges might be eliminated by partial dismissal of
the indictment; they also could be reduced to lesser included offenses.
Since the remedy has an equitable provenance, the court would have
discretion to reduce or eliminate the charges on the facts of each partic-
ular case. This would be a radical enlargement of orthodox grounds for
dismissing all or part of an indictment, but the privatization of criminal
justice entailed in the contractual model demands a radical departure.
Modern contract law seeks to avoid allowing one party significant bene-
fits under a bargain while the oth.r party gets nothing. Since we now
allow the disposition of an offender to be dictated by a negotiated con-
tract with the State, largely independent of considerations of guilt and
moral worth, we cannot shrink from modifying the charging and pun-
ishment processes in ways governed by the same modalities.
A different problem arises when a promise becomes impossible to
execute while the agreement is still executory. Although the cooperator
is in perfect good faith and has not breached the agreement, he may not
yet have conferred any benefit on the government or acted to his own
detriment. The guiding principle of modern law here is found in Mabry
v. Johnson.211 In Mabry the government offered the defendant a plea
bargain with a recommendation for a sentence of twenty-one years to
be served concurrently with another sentence. When the defendant
sought to accept the offer, the government informed him that a mistake
had been made and proposed a new offer under which the sentences
would be consecutive. The Supreme Court held that the original offer
was not rendered binding by the acceptance. The Court stressed the
performance is an appropriate remedy for a defendant who shows that the government has
breached a plea bargain is an acknowledgment that defendants have expectation rights in plea
bargains and that these rights have due process implications since the defendant gains these rights
by forfeiting constitutional protections. Id. at 1069-75.
209. One aspect of this complexity is that the defendant often will incur obligations that
extend over a considerable period of time, perhaps years. Since these obligations may be difficult
to perform (especially where they involve continuing undercover relations with criminals), the
chance of some breach, in spite of very substantial compliance with the agreement, is great. Sher-
man, supra note 13, at 67.
210. In the federal system, an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines would be necessary.
211. 467 U.S. 504 (1983).
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nonconstitutional nature of a plea bargain that a court had not yet con-
summated by acceptance of the plea. Until the plea is consummated,
the Court noted, it is merely an executory contract without the consti-
tutional significance to compel judicial intervention.21 2
On its facts Mabry may be unobjectionable, but its application may
cause difficulty with cooperation agreements. Mere discussion of the
possibility of immunity or leniency on a plea clearly should not create
any enforceable rights. Once the potential cooperator has made a prof-
fer, however, the situation is more controversial. In Hammers v. State,
for example, a cooperator had agreed with the prosecution to testify
against her lover in a murder case in exchange for immunity.213 She
stood ready at all times to testify, but the defendant pleaded,214 render-
ing her testimony unnecessary. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed
her subsequent conviction for murder on the ground that she had an
equitable entitlement to immunity. This decision seems correct chiefly
because of the high probability that her readiness to testify was an im-
portant contributing reason for her codefendant's plea. Although this
was not literally an execution of her promise, it fully achieved the gov-
ernment's ultimate objective. The Arkansas court, therefore, correctly
treated the cooperator's readiness to testify as furnishing substantial
consideration. 15
One could also justify Hammers in contractual terms by noting
212. The Court's position in Mabry to the effect that offer and acceptance do not always
make a contract shows that courts are willing to depart from some traditional contracts principles
in the light of the context of these agreements. They should be equally willing, in the interests of
fairness, to show some liberality in construing the concepts of part performance and breach.
213. 565 S.W.2d 406 (Ark. 1978).
214. It appears that the prosecutor became uneasy about the strength of Hammers' expected
testimony and, therefore,.used the threat of Hammers' testimony to obtain the other defendant's
plea. A condition of the plea was that the other defendant would now testify against Hammers. By
playing one defendant against the other, and breaking his agreement with Hammers, the prosecu-
tor hoped to register convictions against both.
215. Some decisions, however, go the other way. In the plea-bargain case of People v. Boyt,
488 N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 1985), the cooperator agreed to testify against a codefendant in return for
charge reduction. As in Hammers, the codefendant pleaded guilty, making the cooperator's testi-
mony unnecessary. The court held that the cooperator could not hold the State to its promise since
she had not yet surrendered any constitutional right. Even more perverse is the holding, again by
the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891 (IMI. 1988). In Navarroli the
prosecutor promised the defendant reduced charges if he acted as an informant. It was undisputed
that the defendant carried out his side of the bargain. The court, however, upheld the prosecutor's
failure to comply with the agreement on the ground that no plea actually had been entered. This is
an indefensible formalism. Doctrines of due process should estop the State from reneging when the
defendant has furnished consideration. The agreement was not purely executory, as in Mabry v.
Johnson. The Illinois court's logic also would suggest that immunity promises would never be
enforceable since they would never result in the acceptance of a plea. This reasoning would do
great harm to prosecutors by making it difficult to assure potential cooperators that they can rely
on agreements.
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that the full performance of the cooperator's promise was frustrated by
circumstances beyond her control. In circumstances of frustration, the
government should be held to its promise when it benefits from the co-
operation.216 Counsel for the cooperator should try to address these po-
tential difficulties during the negotiations of the agreement, but courts
should not punish cooperators if their counsel fails or is unable to do so.
VI. PROCEDURAL DEFORMATIONS
A. Appellate Review Problems
Several familiar features of the criminal process are hostile to the
aims of cooperation agreements. This hostility sometimes stems from
the special features of cooperation agreements and sometimes from
their similarities with plea bargains generally. For example, plea bar-
gaining often conflicts with the appellate process. From the State's per-
spective, the attraction of the plea bargain lies in the certain and
settled quality of the conviction. If, after the prosecutor already has
granted leniency, the ungrateful defendant seeks to upset the arrange-
ment on appeal, the prosecutor is likely to feel aggrieved. The response
has been the inclusion in plea agreements of clauses binding the de-
fendant not to appeal.217 Courts sometimes have had difficulty in
resolving this natural antipathy between traditional features of criminal
procedure and the very different logic of privatized criminal justice.
An interesting example is presented in United States v. ShawS-a
series of prosecutions for bid-rigging bribery and kickbacks. The gov-
ernment informed Shaw that he was a target and invited him to discuss
a plea agreement. During negotiations the government raised four
216. This conclusion is supported by the old equitable doctrine of quantum meruit.
217. Several courts have held that an agreement not to appeal, as long as it was voluntarily
arrived at and does not prohibit a challenge to the voluntariness or intelligence of the plea, is
binding and does not invalidate a plea when time to appeal has expired. See the cases collected in
Kristine Karnezis, Annotation, Validity and Effect of Criminal Defendant's Express Waiver of
Right to Appeal as Part of Negotiated Plea Agreement, 89 A.L.R. 3D 864 (1979). Some of these
courts also hold that a defendant under such an agreement will not be barred from appealing while
an appeal is still timely. Id. Filing an appeal in such circumstances, however, may cause the prose-
cution to move to vacate the plea. If such a motion is made, double jeopardy will not be an obsta-
cle to fresh proceedings against the defendant. Id. A few courts have disapproved of covenants not
to appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. March, 293 A.2d 57, 62 (Pa. 1972) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(suggesting that "[tjo sanction [a no-appeal clause in a plea agreement] serves no proper interest
of justice and would only invite attempts to insulate guilty pleas unlawfully obtained from appro-
priate appellate review"); see also People v. Stevenson, 231 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. 1975) (declaring
that public policy will not permit the prosecutor to bar the review of a conviction). See generally
Gregory M. Dyer & Brendan Judge, Note, Criminal Defendants' Waiver of the Right to Ap-
peal-An Unacceptable Condition of A Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65 NoTRE DAME L.
Rav. 649 (1990).
218. 655 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1981).
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counts that it intended to include in the indictment against Shaw.
Shaw's counsel argued that two of the counts were bogus because they
alleged bribery of a public official and the person allegedly bribed, an
employee of the Federal Reserve Bank, was not a public official for pur-
poses of the statute.2 19 The government was not persuaded. Before in-
dictment Shaw's lawyer and the United States Attorney finally reached
an agreement by which Shaw would give information about and testify
against other defendants in return for being allowed to plead guilty to
any one of the four counts. The government consented to move to dis-
miss the other counts. As part of the agreement, Shaw also promised
not to appeal his conviction.
Shaw testified as promised before the grand jury and then, under
the terms of the bargain, chose to plead guilty to one of the charges of
bribing a public official. After the plea, however, Shaw filed, under Rule
34 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion in arrest of
judgment, which can be based only on want of jurisdiction in the court
or failure of the indictment to state an offense. 220 A professedly shocked
government responded by moving to vacate Shaw's plea and try him on
the four counts in the indictment. The government alleged that Shaw
had committed a "fraud on the court and the government" by entering
into the plea agreement with an undisclosed intention to violate his
commitments.221 The trial court granted the government's motion.
On appeal the circuit court reversed on the ground that, under a
hallowed and well-founded tradition, subject-matter jurisdiction is al-
ways open to challenge. It cannot be conferred on the court by the con-
sent of the parties and any agreement that prohibits a party from
challenging jurisdiction is unenforceable. Since Shaw was exercising a
statutory right in bringing his motion for arrest of judgment, the court
suggested, the government's motion to dismiss his plea was an exercise
in vindictive prosecution and, therefore, should have been denied.222
219. The federal statute at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
220. Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an objection to
an indictment on the ground that "it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense
... shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings." Rule 12 is
presumably a sufficient basis for a postverdict or postplea motion to dismiss the indictment. Rule
34, with its archaic formula of moving in arrest of judgment, is, therefore, probably superfluous.
221. 655 F.2d at 171. The government "freely admit[ted] that it moved to vacate Shaw's
guilty plea in retaliation for Shaw's exercise of his right ... to file a Motion in Arrest of Judgment
after pleading guilty." Id.
222. In the Ninth Circuit at the time of the Shaw decision, the rule was that a district court's
ruling against the defendant on a pretrial claim of vindictive prosecution constituted a "final deci-
sion" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, therefore, could be appealed before conviction.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263
(1982), that the right to relief from vindictive prosecution is fully protected by postconviction
review. Today, therefore, in federal court Shaw would have to submit to trial or to a plea and
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The Shaw decision is surely correct. Shaw was at all times willing
to cooperate under the terms of the agreement. The government un-
wisely gave Shaw the choice of picking his charge for pleading, and
Shaw turned that to his advantage. The government permitted him to
plead exclusively to a charge the legality of which he had always
contested.
The court of appeals' decision may seem disturbing since, assuming
that Shaw's Rule 34 motion was well grounded, Shaw escaped convic-
tion altogether. Public interest thus was not well served by the coopera-
tion agreement. The government was properly held, however, to its
unwise agreement. The government overreached by arguing that it
could bind Shaw to abandon any challenge to the prosecution's inter-
pretation of the public official bribery statute. It sought to fend off judi-
cial review of its charges, even though the public interest and the
demands of justice would seem to clamor for adjudication of an impor-
tant question concerning the definition of a federal crime. If the govern-
ment's position were accepted, the United States Attorney could
insulate his office's interpretation of a statute from review by never try-
ing a case involving a challenge to a statute. The prosecutor thus could
continue to use the disputed statutory provision for plea agreements
with a built-in barrier to judicial review. If the government wishes to
make the most of cooperation agreements, perhaps it should brush up
on its contract law, as well as its criminal procedure concepts.
The issues in Shaw serve as a microcosm of much that is trouble-
some about plea bargains in general and cooperation agreements in par-
ticular. It highlights the breadth of prosecutorial discretion and the
great power of prosecutorial pressure to seal a bargain and suppress
questions that may deserve public scrutiny. True, the attempt failed in
Shaw, but it will succeed in many cases where the defendant is less
bold or where the contested issue is not clearly a jurisdictional one.
B. Double Jeopardy Problems
While the cooperation agreement, like all plea bargains, avoids
public inquiry into the cooperator's role and seeks to ban appeals as
well as avoid trials, there still must be restraint and caution in execut-
ing the agreement lest the defendant enjoy an irrevocable benefit before
sentence arrangement before he could appeal on this ground. This surely will discourage these
challenges after plea agreements, especially since bail may be denied after sentence and pending
appeal. To escape the vindictiveness, Shaw's better tactic now might be to wait until after sentence
on the plea agreement and then raise the jurisdictional point for the first time by way of appeal.
The jurisdictional challenge is still timely, United States v. Beard, 414 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1969),
and the defendant would avoid the risk that the trial court might force him to trial on more
serious charges before he could appeal.
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he has performed his part of the bargain. The prosecutor always must
be vigilant to preserve the contingent nature of the agreement in order
to be able to invoke sanctions if the cooperator fails to perform. With
an immunity agreement this presents no difficulty since no formal judi-
cial acts take place that arguably could terminate the cooperator's lia-
bility. Unless the statute of limitations has run, the State always can
prosecute the cooperator if it can show that he has not performed sub-
stantially under the agreement. With plea-bargain agreements, how-
ever, the situation is more delicate because at some point the double
jeopardy clause may intervene to bar the prosecutor from any further
action. The State avoids this difficulty by inserting a routine provision
in cooperation agreements that sentencing be postponed until the coop-
erator has discharged his obligations. Since plea agreements may be
complex and may involve testifying in future trials, sentencing may be
postponed for a matter of years. The court must consent to this delay,
but consent usually is routinely forthcoming in cooperation cases. Delay
risks offending the speedy trial guarantee, but this danger is averted by
the cooperating defendant's consent to the delay.223 Waiver thus be-
comes the commanding concept. 24
The principal purpose of delay in sentencing contemplated by co-
operation agreements is to avoid an entanglement with the double jeop-
ardy clause. In this connection we are concerned with that aspect of
double jeopardy that prohibits further proceedings for the same offense
once jeopardy has attached.225 Courts have worked out the concept of
when jeopardy attaches quite precisely in trials226 but not with respect
223. The Sixth Amendment right to speedy trials applies to the sentencing phase. Pollard v.
United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957). Following the general speedy trial analysis in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), however, courts apply a balancing test in which the defendant's failure to
claim or move for a speedy trial strongly suggests no violation of the right to speedy trial. The
presence of a clause in a plea agreement waiving the right to be sentenced at the usual time,
coupled with the absence of any later application for sentencing, therefore, will rule out any claim
on this ground.
224. Postponing sentence is not just in the government's interest. The longer sentencing is
delayed, the more time a cooperator has to please the government, and the happier the govern-
ment, the more likely it will make a generous recommendation to the court.
225. If the defendant has been exposed to jeopardy in proceedings terminated prematurely
without his consent, then any initiation of fresh proceedings against him generally will violate the
double jeopardy clause. This principle often becomes significant when a trial ends in the declara-
tion of a mistrial. Here double jeopardy bars a retrial unless the mistrial was dictated by a "mani-
fest necessity." United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). If a guilty plea is vacated at
the prosecutor's application and over the defendant's objection, the defendant may raise a double
jeopardy argument. The question then becomes what analogues in the guilty plea context can serve
the role of manifest necessity in the trial context in justifying the vacation of a plea over the
defendant's protest.
226. The federal rule, applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, is that in
a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28
(1978). In a bench trial jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn. Serfass v. United States,
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to guilty pleas.221 7 The reason for this, no doubt, is that in typical guilty
plea cases the double jeopardy question will not likely arise unless and
until the State brings some subsequent prosecution after the defendant
has been sentenced under the plea. At this point there is no doubt that
jeopardy has attached,2 8 and the usual question is simply whether the
subsequent prosecution falls within some elaboration of the concept of
"same offense." The unnatural delay of sentencing in many cooperation
cases, however, opens up a window through which jeopardy attachment
questions may enter. These questions, implicating contingent aspects of
plea agreements for cooperation, were the core issues for consideration
by the Supreme Court in Ricketts v. Adamson.2 29
Adamson was charged with the car bombing murder of an investi-
gative reporter, Don Bolles, in Phoenix, Arizona, in 1976. Early in 1977
he entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead to second-
degree murder for which he would receive a sentence that would lead to
just over twenty years actual incarceration time. In return, he promised
to testify against two others, Dunlap and Robison, who allegedly had
instigated the murder. It was agreed that the usual time for sentencing
was waived and that Adamson would be "sentenced at the conclusion of
his testimony in all of the cases referred to in this agreement." 30 The
trial judge accepted the agreement and Adamson's plea was entered.
For the next two years Adamson cooperated. He testified against
Dunlap and Robison who were convicted of first-degree murder. While
their convictions were pending on appeal, the State moved in December
1978, almost two years after his plea was entered, to have Adamson
sentenced. The court sentenced Adamson in accordance with the plea
agreement. But, in 1980 the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the con-
victions of Dunlap and Robison and remanded for new trials.2 31 The
State then informed Adamson that his testimony would be required in
the retrials. In response, Adamson stated through his attorney that he
420 U.S. 377 (1975).
227. One criminal procedure treatise suggests that "[a]s for those cases which are not tried at
all, that is, where defendant is convicted by virtue of his plea, jeopardy attaches when the court
accepts the defendant's plea unconditionally." LAFAvF & IsRAEL, supra note 40, § 24.1, at 64. The
vital word, for present purposes, is "unconditionally." The authors cite United States v. Sanchez,
609 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1980), which held that jeopardy had not attached when a negotiated plea
was accepted subject to the condition that information received later would support the defend-
ant's assertions. A prosecutor thus could rather easily arrange to stave off the attachment of jeop-
ardy for most guilty pleas in cooperation cases. Jeopardy would presumably attach only when the
court expressed its satisfaction that the relevant condition had been satisfied. Sentencing the de-
fendant arguably could constitute such an expression.
228. See supra note 227.
229. 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
230. Id. at 14.
231. State v. Dunlap, 608 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Robison, 608 P.2d 44 (Ariz. 1980).
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viewed his obligations under the agreement as fully performed and that
the State must furnish further consideration if it wished him to testify
again. He demanded as consideration his final release after the testi-
mony, full transactional immunity for any and all of his past crimes,
protection for his ex-wife and son, and funds and transportation for
him to relocate. The prosecutor brusquely retorted that he viewed
Adamson's response as a breach of his plea agreement. The State then
successfully moved to vacate Adamson's plea and filed a new informa-
tion charging him with first-degree murder. The Arizona courts rebuf-
fed Adamson's pretrial challenge to the new charge. They concluded
that Adamson had breached his plea agreement and that the State was,
therefore, free to revert to the pre-plea position. 232 Adamson then of-
fered to testify against Robison and Dunlap, but the offer was rejected
by the prosecutor.233 Adamson was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death.2"4 His state appeals were denied. 5
Adamson's petition for federal habeas corpus was rejected by the
district court and his appeal denied in a memorandum decision by a
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.3 6 On a petition for rehear-
ing, however, a divided en banc court reversed the district court and
granted habeas. 37 Under the majority view, jeopardy had attached at
the latest upon sentencing.238 The agreement contained no express
waiver of protection against double jeopardy,239 and the presumptions
232. Adamson v. Superior Court, 611 P.2d 932, 937 (Ariz. 1980) (en banc).
233. 483 U.S. at 22.
234. State v. Adamson, 665 P.2d 972 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
235. Id.
236. Adamson v. Hill, 667 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1981).
237. Adamson v. Ricketts, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The court divided seven to
four.
238. The majority, in noting that jeopardy attaches when the plea is accepted subject to any
conditions annexed, cited United States v. Vaughan, 715 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983), and
United States v. Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978). Adam-
son, 789 F.2d at 726. Since conditions were arguably still outstanding, however, it is not clear why
the formal imposition of sentence should make any difference to the outcome of the case, espe-
cially since the court already had indicated that it would impose the sentence fixed by the plea
agreement. While federal cases hold that a court's acceptance of a plea binds all parties, this is
usually coupled, in cooperation cases, by the requirement that the defendants have complied with
all conditions annexed. See United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that
"Rule 11 appears to speak unequivocally; if the plea is accepted, the judge does not announce any
deferral of that acceptance, and the defendant adheres to the terms of the bargain, all parties to
it are bound") (emphasis added). This is only another way of saying that the defendant's duty to
observe his side of the bargain necessarily makes the attachment of jeopardy contingent and
defeasible.
239. While the words "double jeopardy" were never used in the agreement, Paragraph 5
stated:
Should the defendant refuse to testify or should he at any time testify untruthfully ... then
this entire agreement is null and void and the original charge will be automatically reinstated.
The defendant will be subject to the charge of Open Murder, and if found guilty of First
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against tacit waiver of constitutional rights made ordinary contract
principles inapplicable.24 There was a reasonable dispute under the
contract as to Adamson's obligation to testify again.241 Even if Adam-
son's interpretation of the contract was wrong, however, an uninten-
tional breach could not constitute a waiver of a fundamental
constitutional right. If the consequence for the State was the collapse of
the bargain, then the State should have drafted the agreement better.
They could have inserted a provision expressly waiving the double jeop-
ardy right, or they might have waited until the appeals of Dunlap and
Robison were disposed of before bringing Adamson up for sentencing.
The dissenters argued that Adamson had waived his double jeop-
ardy rights. In their view the agreement as a whole was senseless unless
Adamson agreed that he might be prosecuted again for first-degree
murder if he committed a material breach. The only sensible interpre-
tation of the agreement was that he undertook to testify in all proceed-
ings against the other defendants. The dissenters further suggested that
the reprosecution for first-degree murder and the death sentence could
not be regarded as vindictive since they were not instituted or imposed
to penalize the defendant's exercise of a constitutional or statutory
right. His current disposition was always appropriate and legitimate but
for the plea bargain, the protection of which he had now forfeited.
Degree Murder, to the penalty of death or life imprisonment ....
Adamson, 789 F.2d at 731 (appendix A). "Open murder" is a term used in some jurisdictions to
describe the practice by which no degree of murder is specified in the indictment or information
and the jury can return a guilty verdict for any degree. Paragraph 15 stated, "In the event this
agreement becomes null and void, then the parties shall be returned to the positions they were in
before this agreement." Id. at 732. The appellate court dissenters read these clauses as establishing
the defendant's implicit waiver of the double jeopardy guarantee. The full text of the agreement is
given in Appendix A to the court of appeals' majority opinion. See Adamson, 789 F.2d at 731-33.
240. The majority relied largely on the principles declared in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938), that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitu-
tional rights," id. at 464 (quoting Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)), and
that to find waiver a court must be persuaded that there was "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. The Court has held that a defendant can implic-
itly waive double jeopardy by moving to have greater and lesser offenses tried separately, a proce-
dure that otherwise would offend the double jeopardy clause. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S.
137, 152 (1977). Adamson made no comparable motion, but the appellate court dissenters relied on
his general assent to the agreement as an implicit waiver.
241. Paragraph 8 of the agreement stated that "[a]ll parties to this agreement hereby waive
the time for sentencing and agree that the defendant will be sentenced at the conclusion of his
testimony in all of the cases referred to in this agreement." 789 F.2d at 732. Paragraph 18 stated
that "[t]he defendant is to remain in the custody of the Pima County Sheriff from the date of the
entry of his plea until the conclusion of his testimony in all of the cases in which the defendant
agrees to testify as a result of this agreement." Id. at 732-33. These events, sentencing and removal
from the custody of the Pima County Sheriff, occurred at the prosecution's initiative long before
Adamson was asked to give further testimony. Adamson contended that it was, therefore, a reason-
able interpretation of the contract that he had done all the testifying that was contemplated under
the agreement.
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In a brief, colorless and unprobing opinion by Justice White, the
Supreme Court, dividing five to four, reversed the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals and reinstated Adamson's conviction for first-degree murder
with the accompanying death sentence. The Court agreed that jeopardy
attached at least at the date when Adamson was sentenced. The Court
found, however, that waiver was amply indicated by Adamson's assent
to the agreement's clauses contemplating reverting to the original
charge if he did not comply with his obligations. If there was a dispute
as to whether Adamson had breached the agreement, that dispute had
been resolved by the Arizona courts.
Justice Brennan, writing for the four dissenters, concentrated on
what he described as "the only important issue in this
case" 242 -whether Adamson had breached the plea agreement. He con-
ceded that the "law of commercial contract may. . . prove useful as an
analogy or point of departure," but insisted that it could do no more
than that "because plea agreements are constitutional contracts. '243
The State had failed to specify exactly how Adamson had broken the
contract. His attorney's letter announcing that Adamson believed he al-
ready had fulfilled his contractual obligations hardly could be consid-
ered an anticipatory repudiation. Far from declaring an intention not to
abide by the contract, the attorney's letter asserted reliance on an inter-
pretation of the contract that had appeared reasonable to the majority
of the court of appeals. As soon as an Arizona court decided that failure
to testify further would amount to a breach, Adamson expressed his
willingness to testify. At that point the State had suffered no serious
harm since, while the informations against Dunlap and Robison had
been dismissed, those dismissals were without prejudice to refiling.
Under contractual principles the State had a duty to mitigate damages.
By neglecting to reprosecute Dunlap and Robison, it had neglected that
duty.
In Justice Brennan's view, therefore, the Arizona court's holding
amounted to a finding that Adamson had breached the agreement and
forfeited his constitutional right not to be prosecuted again simply by
asserting a reasonable interpretation of the contract and bringing this
interpretation to a court for resolution. By declaring that Adamson's
disagreement with the prosecution was a breach, the Arizona courts in
effect allowed the prosecution to dictate the interpretation of the con-
tract. The question of what can amount to a waiver of a constitutional
right, however, is always subject to federal review.
In the end Justice Brennan's dissent, in spite of its initial dis-
242. 483 U.S. at 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 16.
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claimer about the centrality of commercial contract law, itself relied
chiefly on concepts drawn from contract law. This is hardly surprising.
The privatization of criminal justice in cooperation agreements inexora-
bly demands central reliance on contract principles and the consequent
demotion of double jeopardy to the status of a mere gloss on contract
law. A strong view of double jeopardy would prohibit altogether the
reprosecution of a defendant who had pleaded and been sentenced.2 44
Once the propriety of contingent plea agreements is upheld, we must
find some way to neutralize the application of double jeopardy in order
to preserve the threatened sanction against the defendant who still has
promises to keep. This ultimately must mean that double jeopardy has
no significance except as one conceptual way of expressing the imper-
missibility of reprosecuting a defendant who has kept his side of the
bargain. The same result could be reached by purely contractual princi-
ples without any aid from the constitutional guarantee. Double jeop-
ardy thus becomes a satellite concept and, indeed, a supererogatory
one, performing no greater function than to echo the contractual logic
of the plea agreement.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Adamson is more convincing than the
majority opinion, but not because it demonstrates that the majority
misconstrued the proper understanding of a constitutional doctrine.
The persuasiveness of the dissent lies rather in its demonstration of the
forced and unconvincing reading of a contract and the stunted under-
standing of concepts of breach and remedy revealed in the opinions of
the Arizona courts and the Supreme Court majority. One can reduce
the constitutional element in Adamson, first, to the (not unimportant)
caution that the contract should be construed strictly since a constitu-
tional right is involved, and second, to the legitimizing effect of federal
review on the Arizona courts' findings which, but for the constitutional
context, would be insulated from federal review. 45
Generally, Adamson is a strong example of the transformation of
conventional criminal process by the practice of plea bargaining for co-
operation. The classical model views the criminal process as resulting
either in an adversary trial or a plea. In either case the sentence is in
the judge's hands, with actual incarceration time perhaps determined
later by a parole board. Full appellate review is expected as a matter of
244. This would not apply, of course, to defendants who appeal and obtain a reversal of their
conviction. At common law reprosecution after an appellate reversal of a conviction was forbidden
by the principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court, however, took a different view in United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
245. Ricketts v. Adamson was brought into the federal courts as a habeas corpus petition
challenging the constitutionality of the conviction under the double jeopardy clause as applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
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course for convictions after trial and is possible as to some questions
after a plea. Reprosecution for the "same offense" is permitted only if
the conviction was overturned at the initiative of the defendant.
Adamson turns each and every one of these traditional attributes
upside down. The defendant and prosecutor negotiated and decided the
terms of Adamson's sentence. They had to seek judicial approval, but
this is fairly routine and cannot easily be withheld. To bind the defend-
ant tightly, the Adamson agreement prohibited appeal and application
to the parole board for early release. Formal sentencing, which has be-
come a ministerial act, was postponed for two years and might have
been postponed a good deal longer. Sentencing lost much of its conven-
tional finality since, under the terms of the Adamson agreement, the
prosecution could vacate the plea anytime Adamson breached. The
prosecution, therefore, could vacate the plea years after sentencing if
Adamson failed to testify as promised, appealed his conviction, or ap-
plied for early parole. The double jeopardy clause thus became little
more than a surrogate vehicle for arguing about whether Adamson had
breached. Adamson further seems to suggest that the prosecution's in-
terpretation of the agreement is binding because, by simply advancing
his interpretation, Adamson was found to have repudiated the contract.
Even though Adamson performed perfectly up to the point of dispute
and the prosecution suffered no obvious damage, by challenging the
prosecution's interpretation Adamson lost all benefits of the bargain.
To Adamson this meant the death penalty for the offense of lese
majeste.
VII. CONCLUSION
Modern criminal cases terminate along one of several channels. A
very small number go to trial, either because the defendant asserts his
innocence, or because the defendant believes he can win, or because the
prosecution will make no concessions for a plea. The assembly line
guilty plea, by contrast, disposes of the great bulk of criminal cases.
This mode is characterized by a rough tariff of charge and/or sentence
discounts. The discounts depend on the record of the offender and the
degree and circumstances of the crime and are executed by quickly
struck deals. One may more accurately describe these cases as "discount
pleading," rather than plea bargaining since there is little or no negotia-
tion about the deal. For a small number of serious cases, cooperation is
not an issue, but other considerations, such as possible weaknesses in
the prosecution's case, may lead to some measure of close negotiation
with the defense. These are truer instances of plea bargaining.
This Article has surveyed a small but significant number of cases
that travel a different path. While these dispositions properly are de-
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scribed as plea bargains or immunity deals, they have distinctive fea-
tures. Their dominant purpose of securing cooperation coopts a suspect
or defendant into the prosecution team and creates a curious relation-
ship that is both adversarial and allied. Although the cooperator may
badly need the offered concessions, the prosecution also will urgently
require the cooperator's services. While he is faithfully discharging his
promises, the State will protect the cooperator, perhaps pay him, and
maybe even license his continued criminality. 46 If the cooperator fails
to keep his promises, he may expect to feel the anger traditionally dis-
played by the jilted suitor.
The charged atmosphere of this relationship is heightened by the
unique independence and sweeping powers of the American prosecutor.
The prosecutor is often an elected official without clear accountability
to any superior or any institution. The prosecutor's delicate and diffi-
cult obligation to enforce the criminal laws, thus, sometimes is in dan-
ger of being clouded by public and private pressures and by personal
ambition. With the great range and complexity of American criminal
laws, it sometimes seems as if all Americans commit crimes. The prose-
cutor must choose whom and whom not to prosecute. In this light, the
prosecutor's power not to prosecute some suspects may become a
weapon for prosecuting others.
Conspicuous criminal trials often succeed one another incessantly
and are prime-time television news entertainment. They feature promi-
nent local politicians and alleged members of organized crime families.
Many of these prosecutions rely on the testimony of immunized or fa-
vorably treated accomplices. The prosecutor plays the double role of
impresario and combatant in this gladiatorial show, setting some
criminals against others and managing his own champions against the
other side.
This performance demands scrutiny. The chief dangers of coopera-
tion agreements are: (1) improper or imprudent selection of the benefi-
ciaries of informal immunity or lenient bargains; (2) presentation of
unacceptably tainted or suspect testimony of evidence against defend-
ants; (3) agreements with cooperators that may impose unconscionable
obligations on cooperators, confer unacceptable license to commit fu-
ture crimes, or excessively forgive their past crimes; and (4) vindictive
or excessively harsh retaliations against cooperators who, in a prosecu-
tor's opinion, have not satisfied their obligations.
246. If the agreement contemplates that the cooperator shall continue to be a member of a
criminal organization and report back to the government, the cooperator likely will have to con-
tinue to collaborate in crimes committed by the organization. In the overall interests of law en-
forcement, this may be defensible, and in some cases, the cooperator might not commit crimes at
all since his law-enforcement objectives deprive him of the necessary mens rea.
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Courts are capable of sufficient invigilation with respect to some of
these dangers. For example, courts or the legislature could fashion rules
requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony or special jury charges.
Courts also may prevent prosecutorial vindictiveness against coopera-
tors and reject unduly severe interpretations of agreements. While
courts may at times have failed to discharge these duties perfectly, they
certainly have the capacity to do so.
Other dangers are not, under our present system, within the scope
of judicial power. Courts can do nothing about the prosecutorial selec-
tion of subjects for informal immunity, and they can do little about a
prosecutor's offering lenient plea bargains for cooperation. Courts also
cannot control effectively the nature of the promises that a prosecutor
extracts from a cooperating witness, unless the alleged breach of a
promise becomes the subject of later litigation. When courts lack con-
trol, we should at least foster the continued development of published
internal standards for prosecutors. We also should consider the poten-
tial contribution of novel practices such as establishing an independent
commission to advise and monitor prosecutors' behavior.
We have noticed the impact of cooperation agreements on some
customary steps of criminal process and constitutional doc-
trines-notably with respect to the imposition of sentence, the time for
sentencing, and the double jeopardy clause. These departures must be
viewed doctrinally as intelligent and voluntary waivers of some of the
defendant's rights. A defendant always must waive certain rights when
pleading guilty. Loss of these protections is thus unobjectionable from
the cooperator's perspective, unless the prosecutor and courts unreason-
ably interpret the agreement, as was arguably the case in Ricketts v.
Adamson.
From a systemic viewpoint, the phenomenon of cooperation agree-
ments should by no means be condemned. It demonstrates the extent to
which prosecutors can wield their discretion to invent new ways of set-
tling criminal cases. In this sense, however, cooperation agreements are
no more than a refined and complicated version of the well-accepted
plea bargain. The volume of criminal cases, overflowing the banks of
the traditional river, carved out the new channel of the discounted plea
system. One consequence has been the relegation of the judiciary to the
role of assembly-line overseers. The cooperation agreement springs
from a unique impulse-the need that prosecutors perceive to fashion
flexible instruments for securing accomplice testimony while retaining
control over cooperators. The agreement's form grew out of and owes a
great deal to devices, such as promises not to appeal, developed from
ordinary plea bargain experiences. While, in the great scheme of things,
cooperation agreements may be rare, they illuminate the spread of the
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privatization of criminal justice. The cooperation agreement may be a
necessary and even desirable method of prosecuting certain dangerous
criminals. It is time, therefore, to confront its risks and dangers and to
introduce guiding standards and supervision. The traditions and cur-
rent trends of American criminal procedure make it unlikely that this
supervision will come from the judiciary. Attention must be paid, there-
fore, to administrative possibilities.

